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Preamble
The 1990's has been greatly celebrated by the general
populace as the last decade of the 20th century, and the precursor to the commencement of the 21st century. In a similar vein, those familiar with the current state of the nation's
bankruptcy laws view the beginning of the 1990's as the early
years of the still-adolescent Bankruptcy Code's second decade of existence. Lest there be any doubt, anyone with even
a tertiary awareness of that body of law would attest to its
most turbulent infancy. The strife surrounding the Bankruptcy Code shows no sign of abating as we enter the last
decade of this century. Indeed, the legal world will witness
early in this decade an anniversary that looms ever larger.
While 1992 may be spoken of with great anticipation as,
among other things, the advent of the integrated European
Community, for those involved with the practice of bankruptcy law it also marks the passage of ten years since the
landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.': a
cataclysmic event whose shock waves continue to rumble
throughout the bankruptcy courts. As if the tremors of that
ruling were not enough to shake the nascent bankruptcy system to its very foundation, the system's ongoing recovery
may once again be thrown into turmoil with the coming of a
constitutional crisis where article Ijudges are vested with article III powers. Such a scenario might well be colloquially
described as Marathon H.
This long dreaded occurrence is now taking shape over
the still-unresolved controversy as to whether a bankruptcy
judge has the power to conduct ajury trial in that specialized
1 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).

260

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 21:258

forum known as the United States Bankruptcy Court. The
crucial decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Granfinanciera,S.A. v. Nordberg,2 explicitly left that paramount
question for another day. Whatever the Court's reason for
plainly refusing to opine on the issue, it hastened the inevitable conflict among the circuit courts.
At the time of this writing, at least five of the circuits
were at odds over the jury trial issue. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that article
I bankruptcy judges may conduct jury trials in the bankruptcy court,3 while other circuits have found that such an
event would be an unauthorized exercise of an essential judicial power reserved to article III judges.4 The Court granted
the petition for certiorari filed in the Second Circuit decision, no doubt realizing full well the quandary of the courts
below. Unfortunately, the Court vacated the judgment of
the Second Circuit and remanded the case for consideration
on a question of appellate jurisdiction,5 which, subsequently
was reinstated by the court of appeals.
Without a doubt, this issue has generated more than its
share of legal commentary. 6 Previously, this author has discussed the limitations upon the exercise of article III powers
by a bankruptcy court.7 That article called upon the United
States Supreme Court to clarify the so called "jury trial
rule." 8 In a subsequent article, this author examined the
promulgation and resulting abrogation of Rule 9015. 9 That
article concluded that the Amendments to the Bankruptcy
109 S. Ct. 2782 (1989).
See Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania (In re Ben Cooper), 896
F.2d 1394, 1404 (2d Cir. 1990) vacated and remanded, 111 S.Ct. 425 (1990), reinstated, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1991).
4 See, e.g., In re United Missouri Bank of Kansas City, N.A., 901 F.2d 1449 (8th
Cir. 1990), reh'g and reh'gen bane denied, (June 18, 1990); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frates
(In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 911 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1990).
5 Ben Cooper, 111 S.Ct. 425 (1990), reinstated, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1991).
6 See Bever & Cantrell,Jury Trials in the Bankruptcy Courts: Awaiting a Final V~erdict,
20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 799 (1989); Cyr, The Right to Trial by Jury in Bankruptcy: Which
Judge is to Preside? 63 AM. BANKR. L. J. 53 (1989); Gibson, Jury Trials in Bankruptcy:
Obeying the Commands of Article III and the Seventh Amendment, 72 MINN. L. REv. 967
(1988).
7 See Sabino,Jury Trials in the Bankruptcy Court: A Continuing Controversy, 90 COM.
LJ. 342 (1985) [hereinafterJuiy Trials /].
8 Id. at 345. See also infra note 84 (Juty Trials I,provided, in part, a basis for the
abrogation of Rule 9015).
9 See Sabino,Jury Trials in the Bankruptcy Court: The Controversy Ends, 93 COM. L.J.
238 (1988) [hereinafterJury Trials II].
2
3
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Rules had laid the jury trial controversy to rest.' Unfortunately, recent decisions demonstrate that the jury trial controversy is far from being resolved. Accordingly, this article
shall explore the depth and breadth of whether a jury trial
may be conducted in a non-article III bankruptcy court. The
article will expose the origins of the controversy, and the recent Granfinanciera decision and its progeny that now lie in
conflict. Finally, some extrapolation as to the resolution of
the dispute will be presented.
Indeed, the jury trial controversy has far-reaching implications that go to the very heart of the bankruptcy court's
scope of authority. A ruling by the Court on the power to
conduct jury trials in bankruptcy court may eviscerate the jurisdictional infrastructure of the modem Bankruptcy Code,
and indicate a complete return to the summary/plenary dichotomy which existed in bankruptcy proceedings prior to
the 1978 enactment of that reform legislation.
The power of a bankruptcy judge to conduct a jury trial
poses a question of such a constitutional dimension that it
may very well thrust calamity upon the bankruptcy system. A
ruling by the Court refusing to authorize bankruptcy courts
to conduct jury trials may set into motion another disruptive
set of judicial and legislative squabbles similar to those
which occurred in the decade following Marathon.
I.

MARATHON AND THE "ESSENTIAL ATrRIBUTES
OF THE JUDICIAL POWER"

The first vital step in analyzing the jury trial issue is to consider the United States Supreme Court's seminal decision in
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. "1 In Marathon, the Court emphasized that "the essential attributes of the
judicial power" are reserved to article III courts.' 2 In a plurality
opinion, Justice Brennan recognized two facts pertinent to the
resolution of the jury trial question. First, the Court noted that
under the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 (Act) "the bankruptcy courts
exercise all ordinary powers of district courts, including the
1o Id. at 258.
1 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). The Fifth Circuit has decreed Marathon as the benchmark the lower courts must look to as "the progenitor
of the new bankruptcy court jurisdictional scheme." Holland America Ins. Co. v.
Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 998 (5th Cir. 1985).
12 Marathon, 458 U.S. at 87.
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power to preside over jury trials. . . .," The Court then concluded that the new jurisdictional scheme of the Act had "impermissibly removed most, if not all, of the 'essential attributes of
the judicial power' from the [a]rticle III district court, and ha[d]
vested those attributes in a non-[airticle III adjunct." 14 This
clear recitation of the power to conduct jury trials as an "essential attribute" of the article III power, and the declaration that
the same power was impermissibly vested in the article I bankruptcy court, seems adequate on its face to declare that the bankruptcy courts are without the requisite power to conduct jury
trials. Acceptance of this proposition, however, was not
universal.
In Lerblance v. Rodgers (In re Rodgers & Sons, Inc.), 5 Bankruptcy Judge Wilson declared that the Marathon language which
"included the authority to conduct jury trials in a long laundry
list of [a]rticle III powers" was merely obiter dictum. 6 Similarly, in
Walsh v. Long Beach Honda (In re Galideen Industries, Inc.),17 District
Judge Patel opined that it was the totality of the powers listed in
Marathon that "taken together constituted an impermissible delegation of judicial power.""' In Galideen, the district judge further
stated that "[t]he Court did not hold that allowing bankruptcy
courts to conduct jury trials, in and of itself, constitute[s] an unwarranted encroachment upon the judicial power of the United
States."' 9
'3

Id. at 85 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1480 (1976 ed., Supp. IV)).

14 Id. at 87.
15 48 Bankr. 683 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1985).
16 Id. at 685. Notwithstanding the bankruptcy court's assertion, it should be
remembered that, in the absence of any clear authority to the contrary, a lower
federal court is obliged to follow dicta emanating from the Supreme Court. Lewis v.
Sava, 602 F. Supp. 571, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See also United States v. Bell, 524 F.2d
202, 206 (2d Cir. 1975) (dicta must be given "considerable weight and cannot be
ignored").
17 59 Bankr. 402 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
18 Id. at 407 (emphasis in original). Accord Dailey v. First Peoples Bank of N.J.,
76 Bankr. 963, 968 (D.NJ. 1987) (Marathonlisted a number of powers exercised by
the bankruptcy court "which, in the aggregate, constituted an impermissible delegation of judicial power") (emphasis in the original).
19 Galideen, 59 Bankr. at 402. The opinion also stated: "[tihe Court in Marathon
was principally concerned with the very broad grant ofjurisdiction contained in 28
U.S.C. § 1471(c) which enabled bankruptcy courts to adjudicate essentially state
law claims." Id. at 405. Indeed, in another case, Bankruptcy Judge Holland expressed some doubt about the continued vitality of Marathon with respect to the
jury trial issue when he said "it is far from clear whether this jury trial] power
[enumerated] above, in the absence of other judicial prerogatives which were removed by the [19]84 Amendments would by itself be sufficient to sustain the Mara-
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One of the stronger declarations repudiating the Marathon
decision on the jury trial issue was made by District Judge
Buchmeyer in M&E Contractors, Inc. v. Kugler-Morris General Contractors, Inc. ,20 in which the court found Marathon inconsequential
on the question of the bankruptcy court's power to conduct jury
trials. The M & E Court held:
The ability to conduct a jury trial is not an exclusive function of an [article] III court. Marathon is not to the contrary;
Justice Brennan merely listed the ability to hold jury trials as a
characteristic of the discredited bankruptcy scheme. He did
not state, explicitly or implicitly, that only [article] III courts
may preside over jury trials. 2 '
In sum, a number of courts have concluded that "[p]ermitting a
bankruptcy court to preside overjury trials does not offend the principles set forth in Marathon."2 2
The better reasoned cases, however, unequivocally recognize
that Marathon clearly espouses that the power to conduct jury trials
is an "essential attribute" of article III courts alone. The proper
view of Marathon is well represented by the decision reached in Terry
v. Proehl (In re Proehl),23 where Chief District Judge Turk expounded:
In cataloging the [article] III powers granted to the bankruptcyjudges, the Supreme Court specifically noted the power
to preside over jury trials ....Implicit in the [Marathon] decision is the conclusion that it would be an unconstitutional delegation to permit a bankruptcy judge to preside over a jury
trial. 2 4
The Proehi decision was discussed in Cameron v. Anderson (In re
American Energy, Inc. ),25 where Bankruptcy Judge Hill found that
"[t]he Supreme Court in its Marathon decision was quite clear in its
holding that the grant of [a]rticle III powers to bankruptcy judges
thon holding." Acolyte Electric Corp. v. City of New York, 69 Bankr. 155, 182
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986).
20 67 Bankr. 260 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
21 Id. at 266. Accord Otte v. Monsanto Co. (In re McCrary's Farm Supply Inc.), 57
Bankr. 423, 425 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1985) (Marathon does not prohibit jury trials in
the bankruptcy court).
22 Lerblance v. Rodgers (In re Rodgers & Sons, Inc.), 48 Bankr. 683, 687 (Bankr.
E.D. Okla. 1985). See Taxel v. Electronic Sports Research (In re Cinematronics,
Inc.), 111 Bankr. 902 (S.D. Cal. 1990), rev'd, 916 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1990). In

Cinematronics, District Judge Rhoades held that, inter alia, an argument that article III
prohibits bankruptcy judges from conducting jury trials "assumes too much" from
the "vague dictum" of Marathon. Id. at 905.
23 36 Bankr. 86 (W.D. Va. 1984).
24 Id. at 87 (footnote omitted).
25 50 Bankr. 175 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985).
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was an unconstitutional delegation to an adjunct court."' 26 Of the
article III powers specifically mentioned in Marathon was the power
to preside over jury trials. 27 This ratio decendi was also cogently set
forth by Bankruptcy Judge Schneider in Hoffman v. Brown (In re
Brown)28 in which the bankruptcy court relied on Marathon in concluding that it was powerless to conduct jury trials. 2 9 The most recent pronouncements of some bankruptcy courts continue to agree
wholeheartedly with that proposition."0
The Emergency Rule

A.

Nearly two years elapsed before Congress passed remedial
legislation to address the concerns raised by Marathon. To avoid
a total collapse of the system and provide some interim basis to
maintain a bankruptcy court, the Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts promulgated a Model Emergency Rule for the conduct of bankruptcy proceedings which was
adopted by all the circuits. 3 '
In retrospect, the Emergency Rule proved to be a prototype
for the Bankruptcy Code amendments yet to come.s 2 The Emergency Rule provided for the reference of bankruptcy cases to the
bankruptcy judges, and contained an option for the district court
to withdraw said reference. Further, it prohibited the bankruptcy
judges from conducting jury trials. Moreover, the Emergency
Rule established de novo review by the district court of all bankruptcy court orders and judgments, and introduced the notion of
"related proceedings." Related proceedings were defined as
proceedings that, absent the bankruptcy, would have been
brought in a district or state court. In such cases, the bankruptcy
judge was limited to submitting proposed findings and a proposed judgment to the district court.3 3 Significant here, of
Id. at 180.
Id. at 181.
56 Bankr. 487 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985).
29 Id. at 490 (citingJury Trials I, supra note 7, at 342-45).
30 See, e.g., Poissonnerie La Belle Maree, Inc. v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 115
Bankr. 712, 715 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1990) (quoting Ellenberg v. Bouldin (In re Bouldin), Ch.7 Case No. A85-00262-ADK, Adv. No. 86-0729A (N.D. Ga. Jan. 19,
1990)(Westlaw, 1990 WL 95746)).
3' 1 COLLIER ON BANKRuvrcy 3.01[l][b][vi] (15th ed. 1987).
32 See TREISTER, TROST, FORMAN, KLEE, & LEVIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY
LAw § 2.0 1(a) at 31 (2d ed. 1988) (describing the Emergency Rule as the "forerunner" to the subsequent Bankruptcy Code amendments).
33 Model Emergency Bankruptcy Rule, reprinted in 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
3.01[1][b][vi] (15th ed. 1987).
26
27
28
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course, was the fact that the Emergency Rule forbade bankruptcy
judges from presiding over jury trials.
B.

After BAFJA - The Statutory Conflict

To be sure, the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 3 brought with it a number of amendments to title 28 of the
United States Code. Significant to the instant discussion was the
addition of section 1480 which stated, in part:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, this
chapter and title 11 do not affect any right to trial by jury, in a
case under title 11 or in a proceeding arising under title 11 or
arising in or related to a case under title 11, that is provided by
any statute in effect on September 30, 1979." 5
This new section was generally read as authorizing the bankruptcy
courts to conduct jury trials wherever a right to such a trial existed
on September 30, 1979.36 Given this impetus of apparently greater
authority to conduct jury trials, a number of bankruptcy courts were
motivated to explore the boundaries of section 1480. Such ventures
into unchartered waters were brought to an abrupt halt with the
Marathon decision declaring the bankruptcy courts unconstitutional,
and the subsequent adoption of the Model Emergency Bankruptcy
Rule with its strict prohibition against the conduct of jury trials by
the bankruptcy judges.3 7
In response to Marathon, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (BAFJA or the
1984 Amendments). 3 8 Notwithstanding differing opinions on the
scope of BAFJA, "Congress created the new jurisdictional scheme
of the 1984 Amendments from the plurality opinion in Marathon.
To interpret the 1984 Amendments a court must necessarily refer to
the Marathon decision." 9 As postulated by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, BAFJA "was designed to narrow the
delegation of authority to bankruptcy judges. 4 °
34 Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 241(a), 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, (92
Stat.) 2549.
35 Id. at 2671.
36 See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Guardian Group, Inc. (In re Adams, Browning & Bates,
Ltd.), 70 Bankr. 490, 496 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987).
37 Model Emergency Bankruptcy Rule (d)(1)(D), reprinted in 1COLLIER ON BANKRUvrcY 3.01[1][b][vi] (15th ed. 1987).

38

Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S.

CODE CONG.

& ADMIN.

NEWS,

(98 Stat.) 333

(codified in various sections of 5 U.S.C., 11 U.S.C., & 28 U.S.C.).
39 American Community Serv., Inc. v. Wright Marketing, Inc. (In re American
Community Serv., Inc.), 86 Bankr. 681, 683 n.l (D. Utah 1988).
40 Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992,998 (5th Cir. 1985).
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Because the statute evolved from nearly two years of political
infighting and manipulation, the 1984 Amendments were (and continue to be) a much criticized piece of reform legislation. 4 , Pertinent to the tortuous route taken by Congress in resolving the
jurisdictional questions was the lobbying against the elevation of
bankruptcy judges to article III status.4 2 By maintaining the bankruptcy court as an article I tribunal, Congress sidestepped the strictures of Marathon by creating a multilayered system wherein the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction is severely curtailed and numerous
safeguards ensure that control remains within the district court.
An understanding of the 1984 Amendments is essential in the
context of this discussion. Turning to its statutory revisions, BAFJA
vested the district courts with original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all cases arising under title I1 ." Original but not exclusive
jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11 also lies
with the district courts.4 4
Since BAFJA, the bankruptcy judges constitute "a unit of the
district court to be known as the bankruptcy court for that district."'4 5 The district courts are empowered to refer to the bankruptcy judges for the district any or all cases under title 11 and any
or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a
case under title 1 1.46
Bankruptcy judges may hear, determine, and enter appropriate
orders and judgments in all cases under title 11, and in all core proceedings arising under title 11 that are referred by the district court.4 7
BAFJA provides a non-exclusive list of what constitutes the so-called
"core" proceedings.48
As the universe of core proceedings is by statute finite, a second
41 See Countryman, Scrambling to Define BankruptcyJurisdiction: The ChiefJustice, The
Judicial Conference, And the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J.ON LEGIS. 1 (1985). Professor Countryman has remarked that "the best that can be said of the 1984 Amendments to the new Code is that a hitherto unacceptable situation has now been
rendered intolerable by a process that reflects no credit on any branch of the federal government." Id.
42 Id. at 29-32.
43

28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988).

28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1988).
28 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1988). BAFJA does provide an "escape hatch" from the
reference to the bankruptcy court. The district court may withdraw, in whole or in
part, any matter referred to the bankruptcy court, upon its own motion or a timely
motion by a party, for cause. 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (1988). Such a motion would be
heard by the district judge. See BANKR. R. 5011.
47 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
48 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (1988).
44

45
46
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category was created to fill the breach. In "non-core" or "related"
proceedings,4 9 the bankruptcy judge submits proposed findings of
50
fact and conclusions of law to the district court for de novo review.
Any final order or judgment is entered by the district court.5"
Appeals in bankruptcy cases are taken in the same manner as
appeals in other civil proceedings.5 2 Bankruptcy Rule 8013 stipulates the bankruptcy court's findings of fact shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous.53 They are to be "reviewed with extreme
deference on appeal."'
BAFJA's impact upon the question of the bankruptcy courts'
power to conduct jury trials was felt in a number of ways. First, the
1984 Amendments repealed section 1480, albeit by a most circuitous route. Second, BAFJA enacted section 1411, preserving the
right to a jury trial for personal injury torts and wrongful death actions.5 5 Lastly, the aforementioned causes of action were mandated
to be tried in the article III district court 56 and were specifically exempted from the "core" jurisdiction of the bankruptcy forum.5 7 All
of the foregoing points are of great import to the jury trial controversy, as they played a major role in the development of the issue.
1. The Repeal of Section 1480
In Jacobs v. O'Bannon (In re O'Bannon),5 8 Bankruptcy Judge
Steen engaged in a painstaking analysis of BAFJA's enabling pro49 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1988). The interchangeability of names can be explained in part by the statute itself. The law stipulates that a bankruptcy judge may
hear a proceeding "that is not a core proceeding but that is otherwise related" to a
case under title 11; thus, the terms "non-core" and "related" are used
synonymously.
50 Id.
51 Id. An alternative is offered, however, provided all parties consent. If consent is given, the proceeding may be heard, determined, and have appropriate orders and judgments entered by the bankruptcy judge, with review (but not de novo)
by the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (1988). See Teitelbaum v. Choquette &
Co., Inc. (In re Outlet Dep't Stores, Inc.), 82 Bankr. 694, 695 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1988).
52 28 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1988).
53 BANKR. R. 8013.
54 In re SassonJeans, Inc., 90 Bankr. 608, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). While acknowledging that the burden of demonstrating that a particular finding of fact is clearly
erroneous is a heavy one, the court noted that such findings are not unreviewable.
Id.
55 See Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 102(a), 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, (98
Stat.) 335 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1411 (1988)).
56 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (1988). Nor can the district court abstain from hearing
these actions. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) (1988).
57 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) and (0) (1988).
58 49 Bankr. 763 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1985).
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visions as they affected section 1480. Using both a technical
chronology and traditional legal analysis, the court concluded
section 1480 was indeed repealed."9 Notably, the O'Bannon court
opined that to consider section 1480 still viable under one of the
contradictory effective date provisions would also mean Congress had reenacted the entire jurisdictional scheme of the 1978
Bankruptcy Reform Act, which of course Marathon found unconstitutional.' Other courts have agreed with the O'Bannon holding that section 1480 was repealed by BAFJA. 6 I
Nevertheless, there were other courts which believed section
1480 still to be the law and merely supplemented by section
1411.62 The bankruptcy court in Lerblance v. Rodgers (In re Rodgers
59 Id. at 767-68.
60 Id.
61 See, e.g., Morgan v. Lefton (In re Hendon Pools of Mich.), 57 Bankr. 801, 802
(E.D. Mich. 1986); DuVoisin v. Anderson (In re Southern Indus. Banking Corp.), 66
Bankr. 370, 372 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986). See also King, Jurisdictionand Procedure
Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 38 VAND. L. REV. 675, 703 (1985).
62 Price-Watson Co. v. Amex Steel Corp. (In re Price-Watson Co.), 66 Bankr.
144, 154 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986). Cited in support of this position were comments
made in an interview given after the passage of the 1984 Amendments. by Senator
Dennis DeConcini, an architect of both the 1978 Reform Act and BAFJA. See American Bankruptcy Institute Newsletter, Vol. III, No. 3 at 3 (Winter 1984/1985) [hereinafter ABI Newsletter]. To be sure, the legislative history of BAFJA is itself uniquely
confusing. No Senate or House Report was submitted with the legislation, and the
House Conference Report did not contain a Joint Explanatory Statement. Statements of the legislative leaders made in the Congressional Record were set out as
the sole legislative history. See BANKRUPTCY AMENDMENTS AND FEDERAL JUDGESHIP
AcT OF 1984, 1 Legislative History, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 576-606.
Truly, the 1984 Amendments represent a trap for the unwary when one attempts to
divine the legislative intent behind its enactments. Senator DeConcini's comments
were expounded upon in Lerblance v. Rodgers (In re Rodgers & Sons, Inc.), 48
Bankr. 683 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1985). The Rodgers Court referred to Senator
DeConcini's statement that the Senator believed "there was no intent on the part of
Congress to alter or modify the rights to jury trial that might have existed under the
Reform Act .... There was no desire on the part of any of the conferees to limit the
right to jury trial in other areas." Id. at 687 (quoting ABI Newsletter). Senator
DeConcini had gone on to state that failure to pick up the broader language of
section 1480 was inadvertent and that section 1411 was drafted more as a response
to insure that the right to ajury trial would be protected in personal injury tort and
wrongful death cases. Id.
Consider the acerbic commentary in Davis v. Clark (In re Clark), 75 Bankr. 337
(N.D. Ala. 1987), offering another motivation for the addition of section 1411 to
title 28. The district court stated that:
It is an open secret that in order to obtain a quick solution to the
recent bankruptcy dilemma, Congress inserted the right to jury trial in
personal injury and wrongful death claims as a compromise with the
lawyers who represent personal injury plaintiffs. These lawyers did
not press their luck or commit professional suicide and demand jury
trials for legal malpractice suits.
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& Sons, Inc.)63 relied upon the comments of Senator DeConcini, a
drafter of the 1984 Amendments, and explained that "[t]he Congressional record confirms that the intent was to supplement the
language of [s]ection 1480 rather than limit the right to jury
trial."'6 4 Bankruptcy Judge Wilson further noted the floor statement of Senator Strom Thurmond respecting section 1411 that
"[n]ew language on the issue of jury trials is included. ' 6
Rodgers was examined in Wolfe v. FirstFederal Savings and Loan
Association of Paragould (In re Wolfe) 66 where the court noted that
"[a]n accurate reading of section 1411 shows that it merely modifies the right to jury trials in [b]ankruptcy [c]ourts without eliminating them altogether. '67 The Wolfe court opined that this
construction was preferable to "assuming that [s]ection 1411 is
an unartfully drafted prohibition against jury trials in
[b]ankruptcy [c]ourts."
Chief Bankruptcy Judge McGuire
found it "more reasonable" to conclude that a matter as significant as jury trials would have been explicitly prohibited if that
were Congress' aim. 69
The Wolfe court's conclusion, based upon the lack of a
straightforward legislative prohibition on jury trials in the bankruptcy court, became a basic tenet of the supporters of a continuation of section 1480. The reasoning was seized upon by the
district court in Galideen, where the court posited that "the 1984
Amendments were in a large part . . .ratification of the EmerId. at 339-40.
63 48 Bankr. 683 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1985).
64 Id. at 687. Contra Pro Machine, Inc. v. Hardinge Bros. Inc. (In re Pro Machine,
Inc.), 87 Bankr. 998, 1002 n.7 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988). Noting these statements
"were not made in a committee report or even on the Senate floor," the bankruptcy
court refused to consider them authoritative. Id. (citing Garcia v. United States,
469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984)).

65 Rodgers, 48 Bankr. at 687 (quoting 130 CONG. REC. S8887, S8888 (daily ed.
June 29, 1984) (statement of Senator Thurmond)). Senator Thurmond's statement
is quite plain and asserts in pertinent part, that:
New language on the issue ofjury trials is included. Section 1411 will
now provide that this Chapter of title 28 and title 11 do not affect a
right to trial by jury under applicable non-bankruptcy law with regard
to personal injury or wrongful death tort claim.
To read into it that section 1411 was designed to "supplement"
existing law would appear to be an unwarranted extension of his comments. It is equally plausible to interpret the quotation as meaning
the "new language" replaces the "old" section 1480.
Id.
66 Id. 68 Bankr. 80 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986).
67 Id. at 87.
68 Id. at 88.
69

Id.
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gency Rule. Had Congress intended to prohibit bankruptcy
judges from conducting jury trials it need only have enacted the
proscription contained in the Emergency Rule. Congress did not
do so. '' 70 For this reason, the district court concluded Congress
intended bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials.7 '
This ill-advised adherence to section 1480 by some courts
has been a strong contributing factor to the prolongation of the
jury trial dispute. As subsequent cases discussed below reveal,
however, section 1480 was indeed repealed and should no longer
be relied upon as authoritative in deciding if bankruptcy judges
may conduct jury trials.
The MisunderstoodBankruptcy Rules of 1983
Much of the controversy over the power of the bankruptcy
courts to conduct jury trials is directly attributable to the promulgation of the 1983 version of the Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure,72 which a fortiori included Bankruptcy Rule 9015, the socalled "jury trial rule. '7' - The Rule itself was essentially a procedural vehicle which provided the means to initiate a jury trial in
bankruptcy proceedings.7 ' Nevertheless, a number of courts
seized upon the enactment of the jury trial rule as a substantive
ground to exercise the power to conduct jury trials in the bankruptcy forum.
This exhortation of Rule 9015 as substantive rather than
procedural was asserted by Chief Bankruptcy Judge Lifland in Official Creditors' Committee of Honeycomb, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, N.A. (In
re Honeycomb, Inc.).75 The Honeycomb court noted previous decisions in the Southern District of New York interpreting the 1983
Bankruptcy Rules "as conferring its jury trial jurisdiction on
bankruptcy courts," and authorizing and empowering bankC.

70 Walsh v. Long Beach Honda (In re Galideen Industries), 59 Bankr. 402, 406
(N.D. Cal. 1986).
7' Id. See also Baldwin-United Corp. v. Thompson (In re Baldwin-United Corp.),
48 Bankr. 49, 56 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) ("Nothing in the 1984 Amendments prohibits a [b]ankruptcy [c]ourt from conducting a jury trial.").
72 97 F.R.D. 57 (1983).
73 Id. at 150. "Rule 9015 Jury Trial" provided, in pertinent part, that:
(a) TRIAL BY JURY. Issues triable of right by jury shall, if
timely demanded, be by jury, unless the parties or their attorneys of
record, by written stipulation filed with the court or by an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in the record, consent to trial by
the court sitting without a jury.
Id.
74 Id.
75 72 Bankr. 371 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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ruptcy judges to conduct jury trials. 76 Similarly, District Judge

Gerry noted that "when the Supreme Court adopted Rule 9015,
which it did after Marathon came down, it impliedly affirmed the
constitutional validity of jury trial in bankruptcy courts. 77
Lastly, there was the reliance of District Judge Spellman on the
fact that "since Bankruptcy Rule 9015, which governs the procedures for ajury trial in bankruptcy courts, has not been repealed
and because there is no explicit prohibition of jury trials, the
78
bankruptcy courts are allowed to conduct them."
Other courts, however, sharply disagreed with this determination. The proper perspective of the 1983 version of the jury
trial rule was neatly summarized by District Judge Kaiser in
Huffman v. Brandon (In re Harbor)79 where he found his conclusion
that the bankruptcy court did not have the power to conduct a
jury trial was not altered by Bankruptcy Rule 9015.10 Interestingly, the district judge noted this interpretation was based on
the 1983 Advisory Committee Note to Rule 9015 which had referred readers to the jury trial provisions contained in the
statute.8 1

Subsequent amendments to the Bankruptcy Rules, while a
source of confusion, provide guidance as to the resolution of the
76 Id. at 375. The Honeycomb court relied mainly upon Hassett v. Weissman (In re
0.P.M. Leasing Serv., Inc.), 48 Bankr. 824, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("Under Bankruptcy Rule 9015 there is no question that a bankruptcy court has the authority to
conduct a jury trial") and Lombard-Wall, Inc. v. N.Y.C. Housing Dev. Corp. (In re
Lombard-Wall, Inc.), 48 Bankr. 986, 992 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Rule 9015 permits jury
trials in the bankruptcy courts). Likewise, consider the perspective on Rule 9015
enunciated by the Rodgers court:
It is significant that Rule 9015, adopted by the Supreme Court and
enacted by Congress, without change, more than a year after the Marathon decision and several months after promulgation of the Emergency Rule, contains no indication that the bankruptcy court's
exclusive power to hold jury trials in cases and proceedings is
abridged or curtailed by either[ ] Marathon or the Emergency Rule.
Rodgers, 48 Bankr. 683, 686 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1985)(footnote omitted). Accord
Baldwin-United, 48 Bankr. at 56 ("Rule 9015 was left untouched by Congress and is
still viable").
77 Dailey v. First Peoples Bank of N.J., 76 Bankr. 963, 968 (D.N.J. 1987) (citations omitted).
78 Jefferson Nat. Bank v. I.A. Durbin, Inc. (In re I.A. Durbin, Inc.), 62 Bankr. 139,
146 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
79 59 Bankr. 319 (W.D. Va. 1986).
80 Id. at 324. Judge Kaiser noted that "[in my view the function of Bankruptcy
Rule 9015 is to merely implement a ... right to a jury trial if one exists . . . Bankruptcy Rule 9015 does not create an independent right to a jury trial." Id.
81 See id.
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jury trial controversy. These changes were brought about by the
1987 revisions to the Bankruptcy Rules, particularly Rule 9015.
D.

The Promulgation of the 1987 Rules

The evolution of the 1987 version of the Bankruptcy Rules
of Procedure (Bankruptcy Rules) was itself an interesting process, which shed much light on the jury trial controversy.8 2 The
first step was taken in November, 1985 with the issuance of the
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Bankruptcy Rules (Preliminary
Draft) by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of
the Judicial Conference of the United States.8" TheJudicial Conference's Advisory Committee specified its tentative view that it
was not proposing changes to Rule 9015 because that provision
was merely a procedural device, and not one dealing with the
substantive power of a bankruptcy judge to conduct ajury trial.'
82 The Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure took effect on August 1, 1987. The existing Bankruptcy Rules are presently under consideration for amendment, and,
based upon prior history, shall likely emerge on August 1, 1991 as the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. See Sabino, New Bankruptcy Rules for the New Decade,
1 BANKR. L. REV. 22, 29 (1990). This small, but not insignificant, change may help
to clarify that these rules are procedural not substantive.
83 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Bankruptcy Rules, 107 F.R.D. 403 (1985). Accompanying the Preliminary Draft was a transmittal letter from the Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules. Id. at 414. Last among a number
of comments made by the Advisory Committee in that letter was a paragraph entitled "Special Consideration," addressing the jury trial issue and Bankruptcy Rule
9015. Id. at 418.
84 Id. The full text of the commentary reads as follows:
SPECIAL CONSIDERATION
Rule 9015 provides the procedure for requesting a jury trial.
Amendments are not proposed to this rule. Questions of a litigant's
right to ajury trial in proceedings within the jurisdictional grant of 28
U.S.C. § 1334 and the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1411 have been the
subject of litigation since the enactment of the 1984 amendments.
Because Rule 9015 only deals with the method of requesting a jury
trial and not the right to a jury trial or the power of a bankruptcy
judge to conduct ajury trial, the Advisory Committee's tentative view
is that no amendment to Rule 9015 is required.
Id. Implicit in that position was the Advisory Committee's belief that the jury trial
rule was in no way substantive and thus any modification was unnecessary. The
Preliminary Draft was disseminated to the bench and bar by the Judicial Conference, with public hearings set for February, March and April 1986 and written comments to be submitted to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure no
later than May 20, 1986. Letter from District Judge Gignoux to the bench and bar
(November 21, 1985), 107 F.R.D. 413 (1985).
At the three public hearings, "little or no testimony was addressed to Rule
9015." Letter from Prof. WalterJ. Taggart, Reporter for the Advisory Committee
on Bankruptcy Rules, to Anthony Sabino (June 12, 1987). The limited written
commentary varied. Id. (citing REPORTER'S SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND TESTI-
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After deliberating on the issue, the Advisory Committee decided
to completely abrogate Bankruptcy Rule 9015.185 This repre-

sented a complete reversal of the position taken in the Preliminary Draft by the Advisory Committee, and clearly placed the
Advisory Committee on the side of those opposed to the continued use of Rule 9015 as a basis to conduct jury trials in the bankruptcy courts.
This revised draft became known as the Proposed Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure, and was transmitted by the Judicial
MONY; RECORD OF COMMrITEE ACTION, at 154). The Los Angeles County Bar Association opined that any rule should address five specific issues about jury trials in
bankruptcy cases. Id. See also COMMENTS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITrEE OF THE
SECTION ON COMMERCIAL LAW AND BANKRUPTCY OF THE Los ANGELES COUNTY BAR
ASSOCIATION ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO BANKRUPTCY RULES, at 9 (May 5, 1986).
The Association of the Bar of the City of New York expressed its agreement with
the Preliminary Draft and recommended no change to Rule 9015. Id. See also REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON BANKRUPTCY AND CORPORATE REORGANIZATION OF THE AsSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, at 3 (May 16, 1986). The Report
further stated that a "bankruptcy judge should be able to preside over jury trials."
Id. at 3. Lastly, this author advocated an amendment to the jury trial rule to make it
clear that the bankruptcy courts were not empowered to entertain such a proceeding. Id. See also Letter from the Anthony Sabino to District Judge Gignoux (May 6,
1986) (citingJury Trials I, supra note 7, at 345). Moreover, while not part of the
aforestated official commentary submitted to the Judicial Conference, the National
Bankruptcy Conference did release a position paper on the Preliminary Draft as a
whole. See Greenfield, The National Bankruptcy Conference's Position on the Court System
Under the Bankruptcy Amendments and FederalJudgeship Act of 1984, and Suggestions for
Rules Promulgation,23 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 357 (1986). In that document the Conference, a well known body comprised of bankruptcy judges, practitioners and scholars, stated its belief that bankruptcy judges should be empowered to conduct jury
trials and therefore Rule 9015 should be maintained. Id. at 362-63.
85 Letter from the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules to the Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States
(June 23, 1986), 114 F.R.D. 205, 215 (1987). A Committee Note explaining the
abrogation of the Rule was added. Id. The Committee Note to Rule 9015 stated in
full:
Former section 1480 of title 28 preserved a right to trial by jury
in any case or proceeding under title 11 in which jury trial was provided by statute. Rule 9015 provided the procedure for jury trials in
bankruptcy courts. Section 1480 was repealed. Section 1411 added
by the 1984 amendments affords a jury trial only for personal injury
or wrongful death claims, which 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) requires be
tried in the district court. Nevertheless, Rule 9015 has been cited as
conferring a right to jury trial in other matters before bankruptcy
judges. In light of the clear mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 2075 that the
"rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right,"
Rule 9015 is abrogated. In the event the courts of appeals or the
Supreme Court define a right to jury trial in any bankruptcy matters, a
local rule in substantially the form of Rule 9015 can be adopted pending amendment of these rules.
Advisory Committee Note, 114 F.R.D. 205, 392 (1987).
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Conference to the United States Supreme Court in late 1986.86
On March 30, 1987 the Court, pursuant to its rulemaking powers,8 7 transmitted the Proposed Bankruptcy Rules to the Congress. 88 In keeping with its historical preference for noninterference in such matters, Congress took no action, and the
1987 version of the Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure automatically
became effective on August 1, 1987.89

E. After the Fall of the Jury Tial Rule
In abrogating Bankruptcy Rule 9015, the rulemaking process attempted to achieve the desirable result of extinguishing
the controversy over the power of bankruptcy judges to conduct
jury trials. Unfortunately, differing interpretations of the Advisory Committee Note abrogating Rule 9015 quickly arose. Indeed, it would appear that few or none of the aspects of the
controversy were laid to rest when Rule 9015 was abrogated.
In discussing the then-proposed 1987 Bankruptcy Rules, the
bankruptcy court in Price-Watson Co. v. Amex Steel Corp. (In re PriceWatson Co. )" expressed its belief that the purpose of abrogating
Rule 9015 was not to negate the power to conduct jury trials in
the bankruptcy courts, but rather to leave the determination of
that ability to judicial decision.9" The Price-Watson court's view
was apparently based upon the last sentence of the Advisory
Committee Note, which stated if the court of appeals or Supreme
Court defines a right to jury trial in bankruptcy matters, a local
86
87

3 Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 188 at 8 (November 14, 1986).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1988). The statute provides:
Bankruptcy rules
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general
rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the
practice and procedure in cases under Title 11.
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive
right.
Such rules shall not take effect until they have been reported to
Congress by the Chief Justice at or after the beginning of a regular
session thereof but not later than the first day of May and until the
expiration of ninety days after they have been thus reported.

Id.
88 Order of the ChiefJustike (March 30, 1987), 114 F.R.D. 193 (1987).
89 See id.
90 66 Bankr. 144 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986).
91 Id. at 159. Chief Bankruptcy Judge Wheless posited that "[i]f this is a proper
interpretation, then the promulgated Rules . . . would simply be neutral on the
point." Id. Accord Win. S. Newman Brewing Co., v. C. Schmidt and Sons, Inc. (In re
Win. S. Newman Brewing Co.), 87 Bankr. 236, 240 n.2 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1988)
("This court accords no special significance to the Rule's abrogation.").
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rule in substantially the same form of former Rule 9015 could be
adopted pending further amendment to the Bankruptcy Rules.9"
Other courts strongly disagreed, however, with any purported revival of Rule 9015. Apparently not wishing to repeat
the errors of misconstruction made with respect to the former
jury trial rule, these post-Rule 9015 tribunals found the abrogation of the procedural rule highly significant in deciding the
power of the bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials.
Illustratively, in Kraus - Thomson Organization,Ltd. v. McCorhill
Publishing,Inc. (In re McCorhillPublishing,Inc. ),9" Bankruptcy Judge
Schwartzberg found that "[n]ot only did former Bankruptcy Rule
9015 not create by implication a right to ajury trial in bankruptcy
cases, but any such implication disappeared when Bankruptcy
Rule 9015 was abrogated."'94
1. Weeks
One of the more erudite opinions of this period dealing with
the entire jury trial controversy was that of the bankruptcy court
in Weeks v. Kramer (In re G. Weeks Securities, Inc.).95 The plaintiff in
Weeks had requested, and the parties had stipulated to, ajury trial
before the bankruptcy judge. Nevertheless, the court decided sua
sponte it would determine if, among other things, it had the authority to preside over a jury trial.96 After scrutinizing the core/
non-core nature of the underlying causes of action,97 the court
addressed the jury trial issue.
From the outset, the Weeks court emphasized that the parties
could not confer on the bankruptcy court jurisdictional authority
92 Advisory Committee Note, 114 F.R.D. 205 (1987). One court of appeals took

an essential neutralist approach. In American Universal Ins. Co. v. Pugh, 821 F.2d
1352 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit noted "it is important to emphasize the
distinction between the power of a bankruptcy court to conduct a jury trial and the
power of that court to determine whether there is a right to ajury trial." Id. at 1355
(emphasis in original). The court of appeals found the bankruptcy court "an appropriate tribunal" to determine the latter question. Id. Such an approach has the
distinct advantage of permitting a bankruptcy judge to determine if an action falls
within the ambit of the bankruptcy court's traditional equitable jurisdiction or if it
involves matters of law that should be referred back to an article III district court.
93 90 Bankr. 633 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
94 Id. at 636. The court went on to point out that the elimination of the so-called
jury trial rule reflected "a Congressional initiative to withdraw jury trial authority

from the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts." Id. at 636-37 (citingJury Trial H,supra
note 9, at 242).

95 89 Bankr. 697 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1988).
96 Id. at 702.
97 Id. at 703-08.
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which did not already exist.98 Judge Brown noted that "there is
no statutory right to a jury trial in bankruptcy proceedings" except in personal injury and wrongful death actions allowed in
section 1411 of the Judicial Code, and possibly for deciding involuntary bankruptcy petitions pursuant to section 303 of title
1 1.99 Significantly, the court opined that section 14 11 jury trials
were to be held in the district court, not in bankruptcy court.'l°
The court next summarized a number of realistic factors that
persuaded it to find jury trials in bankruptcy court to be a basically unworkable proposition. In particular, the Weeks court cited
concerns about the docket, staffing and compliance with congressional mandates for a quick resolution of bankruptcy
proceedings. 0
98 Id. at 708-09 (citation omitted). The Weeks court made the candid observation
that the enabling statutes of the bankruptcy laws authorize the hearing of bankruptcy cases by bankruptcy judges, "not juries. Congress, for example, could have
used the term 'court' rather than 'judge' which would lend itself more easily to an
argument for jury trials." Id. Accord Haden v. Edwards (In re Edwards), 104 Bankr.
890 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn 1989). The Edwards court, finding the logic of Weeks persuasive, further opined that:
The language of [section] 157 of title 28 in referring to "bankruptcy
judges" should be compared to the language of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334
(West Supp. 1989) which vests jurisdiction of bankruptcy cases and
proceedings in the "district courts." Further, the language of [section] 157 should also be contrasted with the language of former [section] 1471 of title 28 which contained the original jurisdictional grant
of title 11 cases and proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code of 1978.
Section 1471 provided for the "bankruptcy court" to "exercise all of
the jurisdiction conferred .. . on the district courts." The change in
statutory language subsequent to [Marathon] from "bankruptcy court"
to "bankruptcy judge" appears, in this court's opinion, to be more
than just facially significant.
Id. at 897 n. 8.
99 Weeks, 89 Bankr. at 709. Section 303 provides ajury trial for the contesting of
an involuntary bankruptcy petition, but does not specify the forum for that hearing.
See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1988).
100 Weeks, 89 Bankr. at 709. To be sure, the court disposed of any seventh
amendment concerns, holding that "[t]he absence of statutory authority does not
deprive a litigant to a jury trial ....

The litigants [could] then resort to another

appropriate court - either state court or federal - for the jury trial." Id. (citation
omitted).
101 Id. at 710. The court expounded:
There are practical reasons why jury trials are not compatible
with this [clourt's normal judicial activity. The [c]ourt does not suggest that it is too busy to conduct jury trials, but jury trials are, by
nature, more time consuming then [sic] bench trials, and one could
conclude that the [c]ourt's docket and case pace demands do not accommodate jury trials. In re Southern Industrial Banking Corp., 66
Bankr. 370, 375, 15 B.C.D. 249 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986), (quoting In
re Best Pack Seafood, Inc., 45 Bankr. 194, 195 (Bankr. D.Me. 1984)).
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As its final analysis, the Weeks court considered the crucial
constitutional implications of the jury trial issue. Returning to
the seminal decision in Marathon, the court posited that "[o]ne
lesson from Marathon is that the bankruptcy court may have
0 2
broad jurisdiction but it is not unlimited in its use thereof.'1
Stating the court's belief that it was not authorized by Congress
to conduct jury trials, the Weeks court, acknowledging its status as
an article
I tribunal, refused to "creatively find" jury trial
03
license. 1

This [c]ourt is not "physically equipped nor staffed to" properly and
efficiently handle jury panels and trials. In re Astrocade, 79 Bankr.
983, 991, 16 B.C.D. 1306, 1312 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987). The rapid
pace of bankruptcy cases and proceedings do not mesh with jury procedures. "Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code to provide a
prompt resolution of all bankruptcy causes of action in order to expedite the settlement of the debtor's estate. Jury trials would 'dismember' the statutory scheme." In re Chase & Sanborn Corp., 835 F.2d
1341, 1350 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 486 U.S. 1054 (1988).
Taken in isolation, this adversary proceeding would not destroy this
Court's functions. To permit jury trials as a general concept is another issue.
Id.
While this writing essentially confines itself to the legal theories at issue in the
instant controversy, the author is by no means without awareness of the practical
difficulties associated with jury trials in bankruptcy courts. It is suggested here that
simple pragmatism demands any right to a jury trial in bankruptcy proceedings be
exercised elsewhere, given all the realistic obstacles, as aforediscussed, to implementing jury trials within the bankruptcy courts.
102 Id. at 713.
103 Id. Refuting an argument that the bankruptcy courts, upon the reference of a
case by the district court, become vested with the same jury trial authority as the
article III court, the court noted that the relevant statute classifies the bankruptcy
bench as a "unit" of the district court, not its equivalent. Id. (citations omitted).
"[T]his [c]ourt," wrote Judge Brown, "should not broaden the statutory authority
it does possess beyond the [c]ongressional and Marathon limits placed upon the
[c]ourt." Id. To this end, the bankruptcy court further opined:
Arguably, Congress could have clearly specified that the bankruptcy courts are not authorized to conduct jury trials. Dailey v. First
Peoples Bank of NewJersey, 76 Bankr. 963, 967 (D.N.J. 1987). It is a
more compelling argument to this [c]ourt that Congress could easily
have expressed its intention that the bankruptcy courts were authorized to conduct such trials. The absence of that positive expression
and the presence of statutory language to the contrary, coupled with
the Marathon limits placed on this [clourt's authority make it clear to
this [c]ourt that Congress did not authorize jury trials in the bankruptcy courts.
Id. at 714 (emphasis in original).
By way of analogy, the Weeks court compared the limited statutory authorization for jury trials conducted by federal magistrates to the lack of a similar provision for bankruptcy judges:
[T]he statutory authority for consensualjury trials before a magistrate
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The court concluded that it was unauthorized to conduct
jury trials, even with the consent of the parties." °4 Congress,
ruled that the court, "must provide a statutory procedure, similar
to that for magistrates, to instill jury authority in the bankruptcy
court . .

.

. To engraft jury authority on these courts, without

statutory safeguards, will invite [c]onstitutional clashes ....
In the interim, parties are merely deprived of one forum, and
their seventh amendment right
to a jury trial is preserved in the
10 6
state and article III courts.

Notwithstanding the demise of Rule 9015, the jury trial controversy refused to die. Relief was sought from the Court, but as
we shall see below, the much anticipated decision left open as
many questions as it endeavored to answer.
2.

Granfinanciera

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Granfinancierav. Nordberg' °7 formulates the jury trial controversy
as it exists today. The question presented was whether a party
is significant to the extent that it evidences Congressional ability to
authorize non-[a]rticle III courts to conduct jury trials. The absence
of a similar statute for bankruptcy courts is equally significant.
Id. (citing King,Jurisdictionand Procedure Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 38
VAND. L. REV. 703, 704 (1985).
Distinguishing the two article I courts, the Weeks court found that the "appointment, jurisdiction, and powers of the United States magistrates are proscribed by
statute and are unique from those attributes of the bankruptcy court." Id. (citing 28
U.S.C. § 636). Lastly, Judge Brown noted that appeals of magistrate jury trials go
directly to the court of appeals. Id. at 715 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) (1988)).
"By contrast," noted the tribunal, "appeal from the bankruptcy courts in this
[c]ircuit is to the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1988); Bankruptcy Rule
8001(a). This distinction bolsters the conclusion that Congress did not express an
intention for the bankruptcy courts to conduct such jury trials." Id. at 715. See
American Community Serv., Inc. v. Wright Mktg., Inc. (In re American Community
Serv., Inc.), 86 Bankr. 681, 689 (D. Utah 1988) (potential de novo review by the
district court clashes with the constitutional requirement of unreviewable factual
findings by a jury).
104 Weeks, 89 Bankr. at 715 (citingJury Trials II, supra note 3, at 238).
105 Id. at 715.
106 Id. In dicta earlier in his opinion, Judge Brown offered:
This [c]ourt has not been persuaded that there is an inherent jury trial
power in the bankruptcy court. Inherent power connotes essential
power. Unlike such arguably necessary judicial powers as contempt
or sanction, this [clourt does not need jury trial authority.
Id. at 710 (footnote omitted).
The court's use of the term "essential power" is strictly similar to the "essential attributes" language of Marathon. While the term is cast somewhat differently
in this usage, shades of the Supreme Court's edict in Marathon indeed persist.
107 109 S.Ct. 2781 (1989).
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who had not previously filed a claim against the bankruptcy estate had a right to a jury trial in a subsequent lawsuit brought by
the bankruptcy trustee to recover an allegedly fraudulent conveyance. The Court held that the seventh amendment entitled such
a defendant to a trial by jury, "notwithstanding Congress'
designation" of such actions as proceedings "core" to the bankruptcy court's ostensibly summary jurisdiction.° 8 Importantly,
the Court specified that "[t]he sole issue before us is whether the
seventh amendment confers on petitioners a right to a jury trial
in the face of Congress' decision to allow a non-article III tribunal to adjudicate the claims against them."' 10 9
Of paramount importance to the instant discussion was the
Court's stark refusal to answer the question of the bankruptcy
court's power to conduct jury trials: an action which engendered
even more controversy." 0 Delivering the opinion of the Court,
Justice Brennan found that the Court "need not consider
whether jury trials conducted by a bankruptcy court would satisfy
the [s]eventh [a]mendment's command" which forbade the reexamination of factual findings by a jury; this in spite of the
power of district courts to set aside "clearly erroneous" factual
findings pursuant to the existing Bankruptcy Rules."'
1o8 Id. at 2787 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H) (1988)). See Stober v. Steelinter
USA, Inc. (In re Industrial Supply Corp.), 108 Bankr. 799, 801 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1989) (Chief Bankruptcy Judge Paskay finding that, notwithstanding the supposed
removal of the summary/plenary dichotomy by the enactment of the Bankruptcy
Code, "Granfinanciera did indirectly reinstate the concept").
Concurrent with its decision in
109 Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2795.
Granfinanciera, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded in Perkinson v. Huffman, 109 S. Ct. 3234 (1989). In the decision below, the Fourth Circuit
had faced issues striking similar to those in Granfinanciera. See Huffman v. Perkinson
(In re Harbour), 840 F.2d 1165 (4th Cir. 1988). The petition for certiorari raised as a
principal issue whether suits involving substantive issues of state law must be presided over by an article III jurist, rather than an article I bankruptcy judge. See
Perkinson v. Huffman, 109 S. Ct. 3234 (1988) (summary of petition for review).
Consistent with its holding in Granfinanciera, the Court refused to address the matter of the jury trial power of bankruptcy judges in Perkinson, returning the case to

the circuit for further consideration. See id.
110 "We are not obliged," stated the Court, "to decide today whether bankruptcy
courts may conduct jury trials in fraudulent conveyance suits," such as the one
brought here by a trustee against a party otherwise unrelated to the bankruptcy.
Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2794. "Nor need we decide whether... Congress ha[d
indeed] authorized bankruptcy courts to hold jury trials in such actions, that [such]
authorization "comports with [a]rticle III[ I" given that such proceedings would be
before an article I judge subject to the review of, or withdrawal of, the action by the
district court. Id. at 2794-95.
shall not be set aside unless
'" Id. (citing BANKR. R. 8013 ("Findings of fact ....
clearly erroneous.")).
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Through constitutional analysis, the Court ruled that, under
the seventh amendment, a party's right to a trial by jury in fraudulent conveyance actions turns on whether the party submitted a
claim against the debtor's estate. 122 Justice Brennan determined
that such a right was not premised upon legislative definitions of
the estate, nor upon a congressional denial of ajury trial right to
those who had not filed claims in the bankruptcy
proceeding and
3
are subsequently sued by the trustee."
Carefully delimiting the purview of the Court's holding, Justice Brennan closed with an explicit proviso avoiding the jury
trial issue. "4 Yet this conclusion did more than set the stage for
the current dilemma. It drew immediate criticism from Justice
White. In a scathing dissent, the Justice asserted that the majority was being "rather coy about disclosing which federal statute it
is invalidating today."'' Opining that neither the Congress nor
any court would know how to respond to the decision, Justice
White disregarded the majority's denials that it was being "coy"
or "obtuse,"" ' 6 and reiterated the contention that, regardless of
any disclaimer to the contrary, the decision
did indeed void one
17
or more statutes as unconstitutional.
Notwithstanding the Court's desire not to rule on the issue
of the bankruptcy judges' power to conduct jury trials, the
GranfinancieraCourt's opinion contains general textual references
that must be evaluated in addressing the question.' 1s In a paren112
1 13

Id. at 2797.

Id. "[P]urely taxonomic change," declared the Court, "cannot alter our
[s]eventh [a]mendment analysis. Congress cannot eliminate a party's [s]eventh
[a]mendment right to ajury trial merely by relabeling the cause of action to which it
attaches and placing exclusive jurisdiction in an administrative agency or a specialized court of equity." Id. at 2800 (citation omitted).
114 The majority explained that:
We do not decide today whether the current jury trial provision28 U.S.C. § 1411 (1982 ed., Supp. IV) - permits bankruptcy courts to
conduct jury trials in fraudulent conveyance actions like the one respondent initiated. Nor do we express any view as to whether the
[s]eventh [a]mendment or [alrticle III allows jury trials in such actions
to be held before non-[a]rticle III bankruptcy judges subject to the
oversight provided by the district courts pursuant to the 1984 Amendments. We leave those issues for future decisions.
Id. at 2802 (footnote omitted).
"'5 Id. at 2806 n. 2 (White, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 2802 n. 19.
117 Id. at 2806 n. 2. (White, J., dissenting). The majority, of course, replied that it
was being neither coy nor obtuse. d. at 2802 n.19.
118 By and large, these intimations, both explicit and subtle, tend to outline the
Court's frame of reference on the all-important matter of the article I status of the
bankruptcy courts and the inherent limitations therein.
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thetical note, Justice Brennan poked barbs at the current statutory structure concerning jury trials in section 1411 bankruptcy
proceedings. 1 9 Terming it "notoriously ambiguous," the Justice
asserted that the notion that jury trials are available only in personal injury or wrongful death actions was debatable. 120 Further,
Justice Brennan recognized that the predecessor statute to section 1411 was "apparently repealed" by the 1984 Amendments
to the Bankruptcy Code. 121 Moreover, the Court emphasized the
limitations of congressional power to block the application of the
causes of action to a legislative
seventh amendment by assigning
22
court sitting without a jury.
Critically, the Court relied upon its recent decision in Thomas
v. Union CarbideAgriculturalProducts Co. 12 3 for the proposition that

Congress' power to place actions beyond the ken of the seventh
amendment "is limited, however, just as its power to place adjudi1 24
cative authority in non-[a]rticle III tribunals is circumscribed.'
To be certain, the GranfinancieraCourt further warned that Congress was not even free to assign initial fact-finding to legislative
courts merely because such courts have been created as adjuncts
of article III courts. 125 The Court reasoned that if Congress had
could render the [s]eventh
such a power, "Congress
26
[a]mendment a nullity."1

The upshot of Granfinancierais clear. Employing a seventh
amendment analysis, the Supreme Court found the congressional scheme embodied in the Bankruptcy Code could not de119 Id. at 2789 n.3.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 2789-90 n.3. In the process, the Court chided the "confused legislative
history" of the various provisions for puzzling the commentators. See id.
122 Id. at 2795 (citing Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 457-58 (1977)). The Congress does not have the "puissant authority" to "eviscerate the [s]eventh [a]mendment's guarantee by
assigning to administrative agencies or courts of equity all causes of action not
grounded in state law .... " Id.
123 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
124 Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2796 (emphasis added).
125 Id. at 2797 n.10.
126 Id. The Court drew an important distinction between the instant situation
and its previous decision in Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833 (1986), where it validated the CFTC's power to adjudicate state law counterclaims to a federal action brought by a commodities investor pursuant to the
Commodities Futures Act. Refusing to find an analogue between Schor and the situation in Granfinanciera, the Court noted that "[p]arallel reasoning is unavailable in
the context of bankruptcy proceedings, because creditors lack an alternative forum
to the bankruptcy court in which to pursue their claims." Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct.
at 2799 n.14.
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prive a party of its right to a jury trial where that right would
otherwise be available. Notwithstanding the ruling, the Court utterly refused to indicate where the jury trial should properly be
held. 127 The natural result of that posture was the instant controversy now roiling amongst the lower courts. To be sure, when
Justice Brennan opined that the Court left that question for another day, he may have done so in full anticipation of that day
coming quickly.
F. After Granfinanciera-The Divergence Deepens
Following the Court's ruling in Granfinanciera, the district
courts began to implement the decision in their own manner. As
might be expected, the unanswered question of the power of
bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials immediately gave rise to
a wide divergence of opinion. Once again, a rift developed between those courts favoring the bankruptcy court as a jury trial
forum, and those opposed to an article I tribunal exercising such
a judicial prerogative.
In Perino v. Cohen (In re Cohen),' 2 1 the court was faced with a
noteworthy set of facts. The plaintiff, an alleged blind person,
claimed he was ejected from the debtor's restaurant when he entered with his guide dog.' 29 After filing a claim in the bankruptcy
case, the plaintiff sought to litigate the discrimination action, and
have it found to be nondischargeable under the Bankruptcy
Code. 130 To accomplish this, plaintiff sought withdrawal of the
reference to the bankruptcy court, and a jury trial before the dis3
trict judge. ' '

In his memorandum opinion, Chief District Judge Brieant
established that plaintiff's claim was in the nature of a tort, and
thereby

triable before

a jury at

common

law.13 2

Citing

127 "Like Freddy Krueger or Jason, the issue of whether a [b]ankruptcy [j]udge
can conduct a jury trial refuses to die. In Granfinanciera the Supreme Court
breathed new life into the jurisdictional monster, yet declined to assist in dealing
with the havoc it wreaks." Wilkey v. Inter-Trade, Inc. (In re Owensboro Distilling
Co.), 108 Bankr. 572, 575 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1989) (footnote omitted). Continuing
his cinema-inspired criticism, Bankruptcy Judge Stosberg "hesitate[d] to predict
how many sequels of JurisdictionalNightmare in Bankruptcy Court the Supreme Court
will produce!" Id. at 575 n.1.
128 107 Bankr. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
129 Id. at 454.
130 Id. at 455 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)). Claims based upon willful or mali-

cious conduct by the debtor may be declared to give rise to debts not dischargeable
in bankruptcy. See 28 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).
131 Cohen, 107 Bankr. at 454.
132 Id. at 455. The court opined that the action was "clearly a legal claim, rather
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court concluded that the plaintiff
Granfinancieraas authority, 3the
3
was entitled to a jury trial.'

Alluding briefly to the core/non-core distinction, the district
court held that the statutes bestowing the power to hear and decide core proceedings also contemplated that jury trials be conducted in the bankruptcy court in core proceedings.1 4 Focusing
upon the core/non-core distinction, the court found that the
plaintiff's tort claim did not fall within the "statutory exclusion,"
because it was not a personal injury tort "in the traditional, plainmeaning sense."'' 3 5 Viewing this case as "directly related to the
plaintiff's unliquidated claim as a creditor in the bankruptcy," the
district court declined to withdraw the reference, and remanded
the case to the bankruptcy judge with instructions to afford the
plaintiff a jury trial before that court. 3 6 Thereafter, Cohen became a leading case permitting bankruptcy court jury trials after
Granfinanciera.
One of the more analytical opinions addressing the bankruptcy jury trial controversy after the Granfinancieradecision was
Hughes-Bechtol, Inc. v. Air Enterprises, Inc. (In re Hughes-Bechtol,
Inc.)13 7 Parsing the somewhat complicated procedural history,
the bankruptcy court was faced with the debtor's application for
removal of certain state court actions, and the defendants' motion for abstention and remand to the state court. 3 " The dethan an equitable claim . . . . exactly the sort of claim which would be tried at
common law before a civil jury." Id.
'33 Id.
134 Id. "This implication follows generally" from section 157, the core/non-core
enactment, and particularly from the subparagraphs therein that exclude from
bankruptcy jurisdiction personal injury or wrongful death actions, which must be
tried before the article III district court. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) (personal injury tort jurisdictions) and § 157(b)(5) (wrongful death claims
jurisdiction)).
'35 Id.
136 Id. at 455-56. The district court disposed of the jury trial dispute as follows:
The [b]ankruptcy [c]ourt may and should conduct the jury trial because judicial efficiency and fairness to both parties will be served if
the entire controversy, as to liability, damages and dischargeability, is
adjudicated by one judicial officer in one proceeding. The
[b]ankruptcy Ijiudge should be that officer. The [s]eventh
(a]mendment provisions, and cases decided thereunder, limiting the
power of any federal court to modify or disregard a jury verdict, because the Constitution is paramount, will take precedence over any
statutory provisions for de novo review of factual findings of the
[b]ankruptcy [c]ourt.
Id. at 455.
'37 107 Bankr. 552 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989).
138 Id. at 553-54.
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fendant's demand for a jury trial played a pivotal role in the
disposition of the case. 19

Bankruptcy Judge Waldron thoroughly reviewed the pertinent law, and held that the proceedings at bar were core, and
were properly removed to the federal forum.' 40 Consequently,
judge not abstain, but
the court recommended that the district
4
retain jurisdiction in the federal court.' '
The court then moved to the jury trial question. The HughesBechtol court began its analysis by searching for any statutory or
constitutional authority for a jury trial in a bankruptcy proceeding. As to the former, Bankruptcy Judge Waldron naturally
turned to section 1411 of the Judicial Code, and recognized that
the statutory language was ambiguous thereby causing confusion
among the courts that had interpreted and applied it. 42 Equally
frustrating for the court was the non-existence of a Bankruptcy
Rule on that point, given the abrogation of former Bankruptcy
Rule 9015.113 Taking refuge in Granfinanciera, the court determined the defendant's jury demand rested upon the seventh
amendment. 44 Accordingly, testing that demand under the
court conCourt's ruling in Granfinanciera, the Hughes-Bechtol
45
exist.'
did
jury
by
trial
to
cluded a right
Relying heavily upon the majority opinion in Granfinanciera,
Bankruptcy Judge Waldron considered the summary jurisdiction
of the bankruptcy court, and its concomitant power to determine
a case as a court of equity without empaneling a jury.' 46 Given
the fact that, inter alia, the defendant had filed a claim in a bankruptcy forum, the court ruled that this created an equitable pro'39

Id.

Id. at 554-60.
Id. at 560. Germane to the instant writing was Judge Waldron's postulation of
the existence, vis'-a-vis' the exercise, of jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases:
The existence ofjurisdiction in a bankruptcy case or proceeding rests
on a broad and complete constitutionally authorized direct grant of
authority by Congress to the district courts over all matters and proceedings that are connected to a bankruptcy case. The exercise of
jurisdiction by a bankruptcy court in a bankruptcy case or proceeding
rests on a limited and circumscribed reference of derivative authority
from the district court to the bankruptcy court over most, but not all,
proceedings that are connected to a bankruptcy case.
Id. at 554 (quoting In re Commercial Heat Treating of Dayton, Inc., 80 Bankr. 880,
884-85 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1978)).
142 Id. at 561.
143 Id. at 562.
144 Id. at 562-63.
145 Id. at 564.
146 Id. at 564-66.
140
141
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1
ceeding disposing of the need for a jury.""
Citing primarily to Granfinanciera, but also significantly to
Marathon, the Hughes-Bechtol court considered the former pronouncement "as a decision exploring the permissive boundaries
of the exercise of judicial authority by a non-[a]rticle III
court."' 4 8 Critically, the court read Granfinancieraas probing the
numerous concerns raised in Marathon as to guarding the sanctity
of the article III courts. 4 9 Against this background of "serious
constitutional issues" regarding the article I bankruptcy court,
the Hughes-Bechtol court examined the existence of authority for a
jury trial in bankruptcy court.' 50
Significant to Judge Waldron was the fact that in the 1984
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, Congress did not expressly define the power of a bankruptcy judge to conduct a jury
trial.' 5 ' The court opined that this lack of an explicit statement
led to divisiveness on the issue by the courts with each side citing
the absence of a clear declaration either authorizing or prohibiting a right to jury trial in bankruptcy court as authority for its
decision. 15 2 Noting that bankruptcy courts are units of the district court, the court found it helpful that United States Magistrates have express authority to conduct jury trials under
147 Id. at 566. Judge Waldron opined that:

Although the above determination could arguably terminate any further consideration by this court of the jury trial issues in this proceeding, as a result of the significance of this issue in both this court and in
connection with any determination by the district court, this court will
also address the remaining item in the suggested analysis ofjury trials
in bankruptcy proceedings whether the bankruptcy court is authorized to conduct a jury trial.
Id. at 566-67.
Moving directly to the heart of the issue, the tribunal stated:
This court believes that a fair reading of Granfinancierareflects a
consistent concern by the Supreme Court that the separation of powers doctrine reflected in the independence of the [flederal Ujludiciary
pursuant to [airticle III of the Constitution requires the Supreme
Court to exercise continual vigilance to prevent encroachment by the
other branches of the government. It is also clear that the Supreme
Court has determined that Congress has limited power to provide authority for non-[a]rticle III courts to adjudicate issues requiring ajury
trial.
Id. at 567.
148 Id. at 568.
149 Id. at 569.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 569-70.
152 Id. at 570 (citations omitted).
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circumstances specifically stated in a federal statute.' 5 3 For those
reasons, the court held that it was "clear that Congress ha[d] not
enacted any legislation specifically authorizing a bankruptcy
court to conduct a jury trial."' 54 In light of the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, the Hughes-Bectol court found it difficult to declare that Congress intended to permit bankruptcy

courts to conduct jury trials. 155
In the absence of express statutory authority, the Hughes153 Id. at 570 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 151). The court observed:

It may be noted that district courts do not have specific statutory
authority to conduct jury trials; however, it must be remembered that
they have the essential attributes of life tenure and irreducible salary
consistent with the full judicial authority of [article III of the Constitution. It is more significant to note that United States Magistrates
have specific statutory authority expressly stating the circumstances
under which they may conduct jury trials.
Id.
154 Id. at 571. As additional support, the court noted that "Congress consented
to the abrogation of BANKR. R. 9015 which governed jury trials in bankruptcy
court." Id. Accord Howison v. Country Hills Assoc. (In re W.G.M.C., Inc.), 96
Bankr. 5 (Bankr. D. Me. 1989) ("The recent abrogation of Bankruptcy Rule 9015,
which had provided procedures to conduct jury trials in bankruptcy court, lends
further support to the conclusion that there is no provision for jury trials in bankruptcy courts").
155 Hughes-Bechtol, 107 Bankr. at 571. The court reached this conclusion while
assuming that a jury trial held in bankruptcy court would pass constitutional muster. See id. The court further reasoned that if one were to conclude legislative authorization was given by Congress for the conduct of jury trials by bankruptcy
judges, "other significant constitutional concerns" would prevent that article I
court from doing so. Id. Specifically, appeals of bankruptcy court decisions are
directed to the district court. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) and BANKR. R. 8001(a)).
This process the court posited "raises a clear constitutional impediment" to jury
trials held by bankruptcy judges in non-core proceedings. Id. Addressing this
"tension that exists as a result of these separate constitutional and statutory requirements," the court ruled that:
If, pursuant to the provisions of the [s]eventh [a]mendment, the district court may not conduct a second jury trial (no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States
[other] than according to the rules of the common law), the district
court will obviously not be able to fulfill its [a]rticle III responsibility
and its statutory duty (28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1)) to review de novo a bankruptcy judge's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Hughes-Bechtol 107 Bankr. at 571. See also Manley Truck Line, Inc. v. Mercantile
Bank of Kansas City, 106 Bankr. 696, 697 (D. Kan. 1989) (statutory provision for de
novo district court review of bankruptcy court decisions in non-core proceedings
renders jury trials in bankruptcy court impractical); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frates (In
re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 95 Bankr. 782, 785 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989), affirmed, 109
Bankr. 968 (D. Colo. 1989), remanded, 911 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1990) (bankruptcy
court jury trial futile in view of requirement of de novo trial before article III district
judge in non-core matters); Wedtech Corp. v. Banco Popular De Puerto Rico (In re
Wedtech Corp.), 94 Bankr. 293, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("[A] de novo review of the
jury's findings would violate the essence of a trial by jury").
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Bechtol court held that a bankruptcy judge should not conduct
jury trials in non-core proceedings which might produce a constitutional conflict.' 5 6 Furthermore, following a brief historical
comparison to jury trials before a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia,- 7 the court found that a bankruptcy court presiding over a jury trial in a core proceeding would "exercise full
judicial authority," just as an article III court, and thus would
"no longer be acting as a unit" of the district court pursuant to
the principles of Marathon.'5 8 Again avoiding a discussion of the
constitutional difficulties, the court stated that bankruptcy court
should not conduct jury trials. 159 Judge Waldron concluded that
the requirements of the seventh amendment and article III prohibit ajury trial in bankruptcy court where parties do not consent
thereto, and a lack of specific legislative authority likewise prevents a jury trial in that article I forum, even if parties do
60

consent. 1

With Granfinancierahaving set the stage for even more internecine bickering, and the differences among the bankruptcy
courts ever widening over the issue, the unanswered question of
the power of the bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials came
under intense scrutiny by the federal appellate courts. The divergence of opinion on the issue soon widened to become a chasm
between at least three of the circuits.
II.

BEN COOPER-THE SECOND CIRCUIT POSES THE CHALLENGE

Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Company of Pennsylvania (In re Ben
Cooper, Inc.)' 1 was initiated as an adversary proceeding by a reorganization debtor, Ben Cooper, against its insurer over a dispute
regarding a post-petition insurance policy.' 6 2

The Insurance

Company of the State of Pennsylvania (ICSP) opposed the bank63
ruptcy court's jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding.1
Bankruptcy Judge Blackshear, however, ruled that the claims
156 Hughes-Bechtol, 107 Bankr. at 571-72.
157 Id. at 572 (citing Capital Traction Co. v. Hoff, 174 U.S. (1899) and Pernell v.
Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974)).
158 Hughes-Bechtol 107 Bankr at 572.
159 Id. The court also noted the "additional impediments to conducting a jury
trial," such as a lack of proper facilities and personnel, making jury trials "incompatible with the presently existing structure of bankruptcy courts." Id.
160 Id. at 573.

161 896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1990), vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 425 (1990)
reinstated, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1991).
162 Id. at 1396-97.
163 Id.
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made by Ben Cooper were "core" and retained jurisdiction.'
ICSP fared better on the appeal where District Judge Stanton reversed the bankruptcy court. 165 The district judge found
the action to be merely "related" to the debtor's Chapter 11 proceeding, and, among other things, withdrew the reference of the
case to the bankruptcy court.66 Moreover, the district court held
that the withdrawal was justified because the insurer was entitled
to a jury trial on at least some of the issues. 16 7 Ben Cooper's
appeal to the Second Circuit followed.'" Apparently, the litigants agreed that the primary issues on the appeal were 1)
whether the adversary proceeding was core, and 2) whether ICSP
was entitled to a jury trial. 169
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the district court's ruling, and held that the proceeding
was core. More importantly, the undivided panel ruled that ICSP
was entitled to ajury trial,' 70 "and that such trial should be in the
bankruptcy court."' 7 ' Unfortunately, it is unclear how the appellate court moved from the main issues as posited before it to its
ultimate holding.
Writing for the panel, Circuit Judge Timbers bifurcated the
analysis, first tackling the jurisdictional issue.' 72 Reviewing the
non-exclusive list of what constitutes core proceedings, the Second Circuit focused upon those "matters concerning the admin173
istration of the estate" that are defined by statute as core.
Recognizing the broad nature of such a jurisdictional provision,
the court looked to the statements of "several influential legislators," and found indications that Congress intended that bankruptcy jurisdiction "be construed as broadly as possible within
the constitutional constraints of Marathon."'' 74 Judge Timbers

quickly proceeded to state that a post-petition contract, such as
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1397.
Id. at 1396.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 1397.
173 Id. at 1398 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) (1988)).
174 Id. Further, the opinion found additional support in the statutory proviso
that, in determining whether a proceeding is non-core, such a determination "shall
not be made solely on the basis that its resolution may be affected by [s]tate law."
Id. at 1399 (quoting II U.S.C. § 157(b)(3) (1988)). The panel viewed the foregoing
"as a demonstration of Congress' intent that bankruptcy courts are not precluded
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
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the one at issue, is "integral to the estate administration. "175 For
this reason, the Second Circuit held that the bankruptcy court
had core jurisdiction over this dispute. 76 Having found jurisdicthe panel turned to whether
tion vested with the article I judge,
1 77
trial.
ajury
to
entitled
ICSP was
Characterizing the Granfinanciera opinion as "somewhat
opaque," the Second Circuit observed that it was difficult to decipher the Court's opinion on whether bankruptcy courts have the
power to hold jury trials. 178 Despite this infirmity, Judge Timbers concluded that the Granfinanciera holding contained several
passages 1which
might affect the determination of the jury trial
79
question.

Such a passage was the "public" versus "private rights" dichotomy, originally expounded upon in Marathon. While Marathon held that an article I court could resolve core bankruptcy
claims because they were "public rights" central to Congress'
constitutional bankruptcy power, the appellate court found that
Granfinanciera "equivocated on that statement."' 180 Contending
that the Court premised its holding that the fraudulent conveyance action in Granfinancieracarried a seventh amendment right
to a jury trial based on the conclusion that such a cause is a private right, Judge Timbers opined that a determination that the
Ben Cooper litigation is a private, legal action would compel a
holding that the proceeding is non-core."''
Critically, the Second Circuit then extended its analysis as
follows:
Fortunately, we need not read Granfinanciera so broadly.
That opinion contains several passages indicating the Court's
contemplation that its holding may result in jury trials in the
bankruptcy court .... [W]e find that Granfinancieradoes not

foreclose the possibility of jury trials in the bankruptcy court.
We therefore will analyze the question anew; addressing first
from adjudicating state law claims when such claims are at the heart of the administration of the bankruptcy estate." Id.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 1400. The Ben Cooper panel relied heavily upon the First Circuit's decision in Arnold Print Works, Inc. v. Apkin (In re Arnold Print Works, Inc.), 815 F.2d
165 (1st Cir. 1987).
177 Id.
178 Id. at 1401. The Ben Cooper court noted that the Supreme Court had explicitly
left open the jury trial question. Id.
179

Id.

180 Id.
181 Id.

SETON HALL L W REVIEW

290

[Vol. 21:258

whether the claims on the instant appeal are inherently legal,
and second whether any statutory or constitutional provision
18 2
bars the bankruptcy court from conducting jury trials.
Looking to insurance law precedent, the court concluded the action
was legal in nature, and therefore a jury trial right inured to the
benefit of ICSP."' Finally, the tribunal reached the issue of
whether a bankruptcy court has the constitutional and statutory authority to hold such trials." s
Looking to section 1411 of title 28, the statute dealing with
wrongful death and personal injury suits in bankruptcy, the Second
Circuit noted that Congress had given little guidance as to the availability of, and forum for, jury trials.18 5 Yet the panel overcame the
absence of an explicit statutory provision, and unequivocally held in
favor of bankruptcy courts conducting jury trials.' 6 In so ruling,
Circuit Judge Timbers reconciled two provisions of title 28 granting
bankruptcy judges authority to hear trials and issue final orders 18 7 in
any action.

88

182 Id. Accord Luper v. Langley (In re Lee Way Holding Co.), 115 Bankr. 586, 590
(S.D. Ohio 1990) ("The Supreme Court leaves the door open to jury trials being
conducted by bankruptcy judges.").
183 Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1401-02.
184 Id. at 1402.
185 Id. at 1402. Circuit Judge Timbers observed that the statute "offers almost no
guidance .... This provision does not even make clear whether jury trials are
afforded for other actions, let alone the proper forum for these trials." Id.
186 Id. at 1402. At least one commentary called the rationale of this part of the
Second Circuit's opinion "somewhat elliptical." Flumenbaum & Karp, Jury Trials
and Bankruptcy; SummaryJudgment, 203 N.Y.L.J. 7, Mar. 28, 1990.
187 Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1402 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)).
188 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)). The court posited that:
Our holding rests on two separate but related provisions. The
first provision is 28 U.S.C. [§ 1151 (1988), which states that "[e]ach
bankruptcy judge, as a judicial officer of the district court, may exercise the authority conferred under this chapter with respect to any
action, suit or proceeding." The second provision is section 157(b),
which, as stated previously, gives bankruptcy judges the authority to
conduct trials and issue final orders in core proceedings.
Granfinanciera teaches that such proceedings, if legal in nature, are
subject to the [s]eventh [a]mendment, but that opinion does not alter
Congress' intent that they be heard by a bankruptcy court with authority to issue final orders. Construing the Bankruptcy Code to allow jury trials in the bankruptcy court is the only way to reconcile
these various concerns.
Id. See Data Compass Corp. v. Datafast, Inc. (In re Data Compass Corp.), 92 Bankr.
575 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988), wherein Bankruptcy Judge Hall found "the authority
to conduct ajury trial [in bankruptcy court] is implicit in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) ...."
Id. at 582. As its rationale, the court asserted that the enactment of the Bankruptcy
Code eliminated the summary/plenary distinction that would have previously compelled the severance of a jury trial action. Id. Judge Hall posited that "Marathon
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While acknowledging that former Bankruptcy Rule 9015, the
so-called "jury trial rule", had been abrogated two years previously,
the tribunal did not view this as an impediment." 9 Making short
shrift of the eradication of that controversial provision, the court
gave tacit approval to other court holdings which relied upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38 or local rules modeled after the former bankruptcy rule.' 90
Almost as an afterthought, the circuit court addressed possible
constitutional barriers to the bankruptcy court's conducting jury trials. 9 ' The tribunal surmounted this obstacle in essentially two
ways. First, the seventh amendment requirement that no fact tried
by a jury be re-examined had been satisfied, Circuit Judge Timbers
opined, because district court review of final orders in core proceedings was not plenary.192 Having found no prohibition in the seventh
amendment, the Second Circuit conducted an article III analysis
with the same result.' 9 3 The Second Circuit held, therefore, that
did not hold this elimination to be unconstitutional per se, and the 1984 Amendments did not reinstate the distinction." The court continued that "to hold that
jury trials must be held in a forum other than the [b]ankruptcy [c]ourt is counter to
the intent of Congress in establishing a centralized forum .... Id.
189 Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1403.
190 Id. at 1402-03. Notwithstanding the abrogation of the jury trial rule, some
courts persisted in seeking authority elsewhere, in one instance looking to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Leonard v. Wessel (In re Jackson), 90 Bankr. 126,
132 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (concluding that FED. R. Civ. P. 38 continues to govern
jury trials in bankruptcy courts). See also Woodward v. Sanders (In re SPI Communications & Mktg., Inc.), 112 Bankr. 507, 512 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the absence of a bankruptcy jury trial rule; following Ben Cooper).
191 Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1403.
192 Id. The court argued that:
[T]he [s]eventh [almendment may well render unconstitutional jury
trials in non-consensual non-core proceedings, because of the requirement that findings of fact by the bankruptcy court be reviewed
de novo by the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 157 (c)(1). District court
review of final orders in core proceedings, however, is limited to the
analogous review that courts of appeals have over district courts. 28
U.S.C. § 158 (1988)); In re Daniels-Head & Assocs., 819 F.2d 914,
918-19 (9th Cir.1987). Since the jury verdict in a core proceeding is
subject only to the traditional standards of appellate review, such proceeding does not violate the [s]eventh [a]mendment.
Id. (emphasis in original).
193 Id. The Ben Cooper Court opined:
The essential predicate question, even more fundamental, is whether
the statutory authority of bankruptcy judges to enter final judgments
in core proceedings runs afoul of [airticle III .... The conclusion
that core jurisdiction is constitutional, however, is implicit in our analysis in [slection II of this opinion ....
If bankruptcy courts have the power to enter final judgments
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jury trials on core proceedings in bankruptcy court do not run afoul
of article III, and that the adversary proceeding at issue should be
tried before a jury in the bankruptcy court.' 9 4
Truly, the opinion of the Second Circuit is the strongest and
most recognizable advocate for the conducting of jury trials by
bankruptcy judges. It remains to be seen how the Supreme Court
shall deal with the question given the especially strong counterpoints offered by the circuits that have disputed the Ben Cooper holding. Once again, however, the Court has passed over the
opportunity to review the jury trial controversy by vacating and remanding Ben Cooper to the Second Circuit to decide the jurisdictional issues.' 9 5
III.

UNITED MISSOURi BANK AND KAISER STEEL-THE
CHALLENGE ACCEPTED

Standing in counterpose to the Second Circuit's decision in
Ben Cooper is that of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit in In re United Missouri Bank of Kansas City, N.A. 19 6
The United Missouri Bank court held, contrary to the courts below,
"that a bankruptcy judge lacks the statutory
authority to conduct
jury trials" in a preferential transfer action. 9 7 Significantly, the
court acknowledged the "grave constitutional problems"
without violating [alrticle III, it follows that jury verdicts in the bankruptcy courts do not violate [a]rticle III. In addition, found the tribunal, "the practice of jury trials in [a]rticle I courts has been upheld
when the authority of the [a]rticle I judges does not otherwise run
afoul of [a]rticle III."
Id.
194 Id. at 1403-04.

195 111 S. Ct. 425 (1990).
196 901 F.2d 1449 (8th Cir. 1990), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied (June 18, 1990);
Drewes v. Zip Food Mills, Inc., 119 Bankr. 197, 198 (D.N.D. 1990) (Hill, J.) ("bankruptcyjudges lack either express or implicit authority to conduct jury trials," such a
trial "cannot be conducted in the Bankruptcy Court.").
197 In re United Missouri Bank 901 F.2d at 1450. The ratio decendi of the bankruptcy and district courts bears mention at this point. In Kroh Bros. Dev. Co. v.
United Mo. Bank of Kansas City, N.A. (In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co.), 108 Bankr. 710
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989), Bankruptcy Judge See contended that bankruptcy judges
and federal magistrates "are similarly situated" article Ijudges, who simply require
"an adequate grant of statutory authority" to conduct jury
trials. Id. at 714. The
bankruptcy court found this authority in 28 U.S.C. § 151 (bankruptcy court is
"unit" of the district court) and 28 U.S.C. § 157 (district
court reference of title 11
cases to the bankruptcy court). In re United Missouri Bank, 901 F.2d at 1450.
District Judge Sachs, likewise, had "no serious doubt that the bankruptcy
court, like the magistrate court, is not precluded by Article I status from conducting
jury trials .... ." Kroh Bros. Dev. Co. v. United Mo. Bank, 108 Bankr. 228, 229
(W.D. Mo. 1989). Moreover, the district court opined that legislative awareness of
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presented in the case but it reached only the statutory
question. 198
Briefly looking to the facts, the trustee of the bankrupt Kroh
Brothers Development Company had brought an adversary proceeding against United Missouri Bank seeking the recovery of approximately $4 million of allegedly fraudulent transfers.99 The
bank had not previously appeared nor had it filed a claim in the
bankruptcy court, but it did file a jury trial demand after the
Granfinancieradecision.2 °0
In deciding the controversy, the United Missouri Bank court
focused on Granfinanciera and Ben Cooper.20 1 The tribunal took

from Granfinanciera the proposition that a party to an adversary
proceeding in which private rights are implicated may have a seventh amendment right to a jury trial.20 2 Above all else, the
Eighth Circuit distinguished the GranfinacieraCourt's decision on
the instant decision as to which judge
the right to ajury trial20from
3
should hold the trial.

Commencing its analysis in earnest, the panel made a historical review of the authority of the article I bankruptcy courts.20 4
Particularly telling were the Eighth Circuit's observations as to
the traditional boundaries of such legislatively-mandated
tribunals.
The United Missouri Bank court posited that bankruptcy
courts lack constitutional and legislative authority to conduct jury
former Bankruptcy Rule 9015 is a "further indication of Congressional approval of
jury trials conducted by bankruptcy judges." Id. at 229 n. 1.
198 United Missouri Bank, 901 F.2d at 1450 n. 1. "The central issue we confront,"
wrote Chief Judge Lay, "is whether a bankruptcy judge ... has the statutory and
constitutional authority to conduct jury trials in a core proceeding in bankruptcy."
Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
199 Id. at 1450.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 1451. "In all due respect to our sister circuit," wrote the panel, "we
must disagree with the Second Circuit's holding that a bankruptcy judge has the
statutory authority to conduct jury trials." Id. at 1451.
202

Id.

Id. n. 8. Chief Judge Lay opined that:
It is important to distinguish between the issue decided in
Granfinanciera and the issue this court decides. The Supreme Court
decided the right to a jury trial without deciding which judge, the district court judge or the bankruptcy judge would conduct the trial. In
this case, however, we consider only the issue of which judge shall
preside at the jury trial.
Id. (emphasis in original).
203

204

Id. at 1451-54.
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trials. 20 5 After noting that the summary jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts vested by the Bankruptcy Act of 1898206 was comprised of equitable matters that did not involve jury trials,2 °7 the
opinion recalled that plenary matters were heard either in the
district court or in the bankruptcy court with the consent of the
parties.2° 8
Bringing this overview into the era of the modem Bankruptcy Code, Chief Judge Lay noted four critical facts. First, in
promulgating the 1978 Bankruptcy Code it was clear from Congress' "extremely broad" jurisdictional grant that the legislature
expected bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials.20 9 Second, the
Court had interpreted the new bankruptcy laws it struck down as
giving the article I bankruptcy court the power to conduct jury
trials. 2 '0 Third, the Eighth Circuit observed that the Court, in
response, struck down this pervasive grant of jurisdiction as unconstitutional. 21 Fourth, the 1984 Amendments to the BankId. at 1451-52. The court observed that:
Article I courts are courts of special jurisdiction created by Congress
that cannot be given the plenary powers of [a]rticle III courts. Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co ...
The authority
of the [a]rticle I court is not only circumscribed by the constitution,
but limited as well by the powers given to it by Congress. See Ex parte
Bakelite Corp ...
see also Plastiras v. Idell (In re Sequoia Auto Brokers, Ltd., Inc.) ....
("Congress vests bankruptcy courts with their
jurisdiction and their authority has no 'inherent' source."). Although
we view this issue in light of the 1984 Act, the historical role of bankruptcy judges illustrates an absence of legislatively authorized power
to conduct a jury trial on preferential transfers.
Id. (citations omitted).
206 Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1979), reprinted in I app.
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 (15th ed. 1987).
207 Id. at 1452 (citing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 336-37 (1966)).
208 Id. (citing Marathon, 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982)). Specifically, the panel found
that:
Until 1973, there was no indication as to which forum was to conduct
these jury trials. The bankruptcy rules promulgated by the Judicial
Conference in 1973 required jury trials on dischargeability claims to
be held in the district court unless a local rule provided otherwise ....
Jury trials involving involuntary petitions were to be conducted by the
bankruptcy judge unless trial was demanded before the district court
or a local rule required jury trials in the district court . . . . Thus,
there was no statutory authority for bankruptcy judges to conduct jury
trials under the 1898 Act, and the procedural rules governing the
bankruptcy courts did not grant this authority until 1973.
Id.
209 Id. at 1452-53.
210 Id. at 1453 n.10 (citing Marathon, 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982)).
211 Id. at 1453.
205
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ruptcy Code revoked jury trial authority2 1 2 with Congress
court juestablishing a bifurcated system allocating bankruptcy
213
proceedings.
non-core
and
core
between
risdiction
The Eighth Circuit concluded from the foregoing that there
was no express statutory pronouncement on whether or not
bankruptcy judges have authority to conduct jury trials.2 14 Since
Congress is the source of authority for the article I bankruptcy
courts, however, the tribunal turned to a review of the relevant
statutes in search of an express grant of authority with the
avowed purpose of determining the intent of Congress.21 5
Chief Judge Lay first exposited the results of the tribunal's
search for some express authority vested in the bankruptcy
courts. The United Missouri Bank Court failed to find a pronouncement of such a right.2 16 Since express authorization was
clearly lacking, the tribunal next looked to see whether Congress
implied that the bankruptcy court was empowered to conduct
jury trials.217 The court noted the bankruptcy judge below had
urged that a comprehensive reading of the statutes demonstrated
Congress' implicit intent to grant jury trial authority to the article
I bankruptcy judges. 218 The Eighth Circuit strongly disagreed,
emphasizing that such a conclusion was contrary to the legislative
intent.2 19
212 Id. at 1453 n. I1 (citing repeal of 28 U.S.C. § 1480 by the 1984 Amendments).
213 Id. at 1453. As to "non-core" matters, the panel opined that the statutory
process governing such proceedings "is in our judgment incompatible with any
implication that Congress has provided the bankruptcy court the authority to try
jury cases in non-core proceedings." Id. (footnote omitted). Contra Perino v. Cohen
(In re Cohen), 107 Bankr. 453, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
214 Id. at 1453. The court noted, however, that the actual right to a jury trial was
preserved. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1411 (1988)).
215 Id.

216 Id. at 1454. The court's review was as follows:
As the Second Circuit acknowledged, the 1984 Act, and in particular
section 157, does not contain any specific or express language granting a bankruptcy judge authority to conduct jury trials.... The references to jury trials in the 1984 Act address only the authority of the
district court ....
Congress has previously provided express statutory
authority to conduct jury trials to a non-[a]rticle III tribunal . . . and

thus, we believe, is aware of the language necessary to expressly grant
that authority. The language of the 1984 Act does not grant jury trial
authority.
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
217 Id.
218 Id.

219 Id. at 1455 (footnote omitted). In its parenthetical discussion, the court detailed the basis for its reasoning:
The one statement in the legislative history that arguably supports
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The panel recognized that Granfinancierademands a jury trial
be provided in a "private rights" cause of action, such as the one
before it. 22° The court agreed that even if jury trials in bank-

ruptcy courts were not expressly authorized, the authority could
be implied if it were required to effectuate the legislation. 22 1 The
panel did not, however, think the jury trial power so vital as to
effectuate the bankruptcy laws that, by necessity, it had to be
implied.22 2
jury trial authority is, at the same time, too vague and ambiguous to
do so. In discussing the powers of bankruptcy judges, Representative
Kindness stated: "The bankruptcy judge will conduct the trial, [and]
make a recommendation to the district court[ ....r 130 CONG. REC.
H6242 (Mar. 21, 1984). This statement was made during the debate
over [a]rticle III status for bankruptcy judges. Representative Kindness also pointed out that his amendment, to create non-[a]rticle III
bankruptcy judges which was eventually adopted, was "essentially a
legislative enactment of the emergency bankruptcy rule, the model
rule that has been in effect, under which the bankruptcy courts have
been operating ....[The amendment] add[s] the endorsement of the
Congress to the emergency rule, the model rule under which the
I" Id. The Emergency Rules were
court has been operating[ ....
adopted by the Judicial Conference in response to the Marathon decision, to provide operating rules for the bankruptcy courts until Congress enacted a new system. The Emergency Rules prohibited
bankruptcy judges from conducting jury trials. See Emergency Rule
(d)(1)(D), reprinted in 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, § 3.01(l)(b)(vi) (15th
ed. 1989). Thus, if anything can be gleaned from this commentary, it
is that Congress intended to continue the Emergency Rule's prohibition against bankruptcy judges conducting jury trials.
Id. at 1455 n. 16. The court's review was as follows:
We regret this argument as contrary to Congress' intent. The legislative history of the 1984 Act, while not particularly illuminating on this
issue, does not support this argument. The possibly relevant legislative history reveals only a debate over whether to vest bankruptcy
judges with [a]rticle III status.... There is no discussion in the legislative record that suggests Congress intended to grant bankruptcy
judges the authority to conduct jury trials.
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
220 Id. at 1455.
221 Id. at 1455 (citing 2A SUTHERLAND, STAT. CONST. § 55.04 (1984)).
222 Id. at 1456. The Eighth Circuit posited that:
It is not enough that the implied power is consistent with the legislation from which it is implied. "The power to be implied.., must be
practically indispensable and essential in order to execute the power
actually conferred." However, the power to conduct jury trials is not
indispensable to bankruptcy judges' ability to execute the authority
conferred by the 1984 Act. Bankruptcy judges are vested with fairly
broad power to "hear and determine" and "enter appropriate orders
and judgments" in core proceedings, but we do not believe this broad
grant of authority contemplates that the authority to conduct jury trials is an indispensable power necessary to carry out the authority actually conferred by the section.
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Finally, the United Missouri Bank Court examined the reasoning of Ben Cooper, but once again disagreed.2 2 3 The Eighth Circuit forcefully concluded that it could find no express or implied
statutory authority for bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials.22 4
Most recently, the Eighth Circuit has been joined by the
Tenth Circuit, in opposing the conclusions of the Ben Cooper
court. In Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frates (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.),225 the
court of appeals set forth the essential reasoning of both Ben
Cooper and United Missouri Bank and flatly agreed with the Eighth
Circuit that bankruptcy judges are not authorized to conduct jury
trials .226
After parsing through various procedural aspects of its judgment, the panel turned to the "final issue": the "proper forum"
for the exercise of the jury trial entitlement.2 2 7 Noting the split
between the appellate courts, the Tenth Circuit determined the
position espoused in United Missouri Bank to be better
reasoned.2 2 8
Like the Eighth Circuit, the Kaiser Steel court reached its decision on statutory grounds, primarily analyzing the development
Id. (citations omitted).
223 Id. at 1456 (footnote omitted). The Eighth Circuit opined:
The Second Circuit's conclusion is premised upon the reasoning that
since Congress could not deprive a private litigant of his [sleventh
[a]mendment right by designating an [a]rticle I forum to hear subject
matter pertaining to private rights, Congress intended that the
[a]rticle I forum have the authority to conduct jury trials. We find this
to be a faulty syllogism. We think it more plausible that Congress
simply intended to transfer all proceedings relating to the bankruptcy
estate to the sole jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court without regard
to whether a party was entitled to a jury trial, or which forum would
conduct the trial. In fact, it appears Congress did not even consider
the need to provide jury trial authority.
Id. To be sure, the Eighth Circuit questioned the suggestion in Ben Cooper that
Granfinanciera contemplated bankruptcy judges conducting jury trials. The
Supreme Court "did not even implicitly sanction" such a result, leaving the issue
unresolved. Id. at 1456 n. 17.
224 Id. at 1457. Accord Poissonnerie La Belle Maree, Inc. v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 115 Bankr. 712 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1990) (agreeing with United Missouri Bank;
"[mierely because it is difficult to reconcile the holding in Granfinanciera with the
1984 Act is not persuasive enough to imply that Congress intended something it
apparently never though of, much less considered"); Roth v. Iacovelli (In re Southeast Connectors, Inc.), 113 Bankr. 85 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (withdrawing reference to
bankruptcy court of action triable before a jury in light of Granfinanciera).
225 911 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1990).
226 Id. at 389.
227 Id.
228 Id.
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of the Bankruptcy Code after Marathon.229 Positing that Congress may have granted jury trial power to the bankruptcy judges
that such
in the original version of the Code, the panel found
2 °
authority was not incorporated into the 1984 Act."

-

The Kaiser Steel court then carefully examined the Bankruptcy Code as promulgated in 1978.231 Those broad jurisdictional provisions were struck down by Marathon, noted the panel,
emphasizing the Court's focus on the improper allocation of jury
trial power to bankruptcy judges, and the absence of a full review
of bankruptcy court decisions by the district court.23 2 The court
observed, in response to Marathon, Congress was compelled to
revoke these provisions.233
After reviewing the divergent opinions in Ben Cooper and
United Missouri Bank, 234 the Kaiser Steel court stated that it found
the analysis of the latter case persuasive.235 Circuit Judge Tacha
opined that the 1984 Amendments significantly reduced the independent power of bankruptcy judges. 23

6

The court found the

repeal of section 1481 particularly important; the statute had
vested bankruptcy judges with the full "powers of a court of equity, law and admiralty.23 7
Further, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the Second Circuit
that the powers of a bankruptcy judge to issue final orders necessarily includes the power to conduct jury trials. 38 Moreover,
with a view to the seventh amendment's prohibition against the
re-examination of factual findings by a jury, Judge Tacha contended that the existence of a jury would necessarily contravene
the bankruptcy judge's statutory power to "determine" the mat229
230
231

232
233
234
235

236

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 389-90.
at 389.
at 389-90.
at 390.
at 390-91.
at 391.

237 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (repealed)). The court noted that "[n]o similar
provisions exist under the 1984 Act." Id.
238 Id. Finding "[t]he plain language of [§ ]157(b)(1) belies this interpretation,"
the Kaiser Steel court held as follows:
A literal reading of this language indicates that Congress granted the
bankruptcy judges the personal power to hear and determine cases.
The personal nature of the power to "hear and determine" cases does
not implicitly authorize the bankruptcy judge to delegate his or her
duty to make final factual determinations to a jury; in fact, it suggests
the impropriety of such delegation.
Id. (emphasis in original)
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ter given this unavoidable constraint on his review of the jury's
findings.23 9
Finally, as were other courts, this tribunal was swayed by the
lack of statutory authorization for jury trials in bankruptcy courts
similar to that accorded federal magistrates.2 40 The court found
that "[t]he absence of such a provision is particularly compelling" to a finding that, unlike magistrates, bankruptcy judges are
not empowered to conduct jury trials.24 '
In conclusion, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the holding of
United Missouri Bank that Congress had not specifically intended
to vest authority to conduct jury trials within the bankruptcy
court.24 2 Significantly, the Kaiser Steel panel suggested that prior
to Granfinanciera, Congress could have presumed no right to a
jury trial existed.243 Holding that the post-BAFJA Code does not
permit bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials, the tribunal declared that where a jury trial right exists in bankruptcy proceedings, "that trial must take place in the district court, sitting in its
original jurisdiction in bankruptcy.

24 4

In brief, this is where the controversy as to the power of
bankruptcy judges to preside over jury trials has come to rest.
The Supreme Court must decide if the court in Ben Cooper was
correct in finding in favor of such authority, or the Eighth and
Tenth Circuits which concluded no such power exists.
IV.

DISCUSSION

Having expounded upon the pertinent statutes and rules of
procedure, their history, and the relevant case law, it is now the
proper time to analyze all the foregoing in the hope of reaching
some dispositive conclusions that might resolve the question of
the power of bankruptcy judges to conductjury trials. Key to this
discussion are four critical areas: the existence of statutory authority for jury trials in bankruptcy court; the role of the former
jury trial rule and the effect of its abrogation; the limits on the
bankruptcy court's authority as an article I court; and, the precedents set by the Supreme Court in Marathon through
239 Id.

240 Id. at 391-92.
241

Id. at 392.

242

Id.

243 Id.
244

Id.
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Granfinanciera. Let us begin with a review of the statutory
provisions.
A.

The Statutory Analysis

As we have seen, the Bankruptcy Code, and its related jurisdictional provisions in the Judicial Code, title 28, endured cataclysmic change in the modem Code's first half-decade of
existence. Pertinent to this discussion was the rejection of the
pervasive grant of jurisdiction contained in the original enactment of the Code in 1978,245 and the substitution of the core/
non-core division of proceedings in place today.246
As part and parcel of this circumscription of the authority of
bankruptcy judges in title 11 cases, there was the putting aside of
former section 1480, the statute most frequently cited by courts
rationalizing in favor of jury trials in the bankruptcy court.
Notwithstanding the lack of unmistakable clarity in the 1984
Amendments, it is nevertheless plain enough that the far-ranging
section 1480 was done away with, and replaced by more constrained statutes, specifically section 1411 and section 157(b)(5).
Working in conjunction, these two current provisions act to preserve the right to a jury trial in the district court for personal
injury and wrongful death actions. Note well that the statutes
address the jury issue solely as to these two specific tort actions,
and provide for a jury trial in the district court, not in the bankruptcy court.247
As to this issue, the Weeks decision is quite instructive.
There, Bankruptcy Judge Brown wholly endorsed this view of
section 1411 being quite restrictive as to the limited causes of
action amenable to a jury trial. The Weeks opinion declared that,
pursuant to the statute, such trials must be in the district court.
Unlike other courts, the Weeks court did not err by either relying
upon, or otherwise attempting to incorporate, former section
1480 into its analysis.
Further, the accepted rules of statutory construction
strongly militate against reading into the relevant laws any authority for the bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials. Con245
246
247

See former 28 U.S.C. § 1471.
See 28 U.S.C. § 157.

Consider also that section 1411 that the district court may order section 303
issues to be tried without ajury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1411(b)(emphasis added). It is not
illogical to conclude that if it permitted a jury trial in such matters, the district court
would retain the controversy and preside over any jury trial itself.
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sider, in the first instance, the restrictive boundaries imposed by
section 1411 and section 157(b)(5) in light of the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.248
Pursuant to this precept, the United States Supreme Court
has held that "[w]here Congress includes particular language in
one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the
same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.1 24 9 It

could well be argued that the specification that jury trials in personal injury or wrongful death suits be heard in the district court,
and not the bankruptcy court, operates to exclude the conduct of
jury trials on other matters before the article I tribunal.250 Further, in response to courts which have drawn implications from a
failure of Congress to enact more particularized legislation, it
should be noted that the Court "is generally
reluctant to draw
25 1
inferences from Congress' failure to act."

Once more, it should today be beyond cavil that former section 1480 is without force and effect in the scheme of bankruptcy
jurisdiction.252 Indeed, the offhanded reference by Justice Brennan in Granfinanciera to the statute as repealed 25 1 should be regarded as the last word on the matter. This discussion would be
incomplete, however, without a fuller dissertation as to the inherent unreliability of former section 1480 in the aftermath of
BAFJA.
Senator DeConcini's remarks, for instance, as cited in Lerblance v. Rodgers (In re Rodgers & Sons),254 simply do not tell the
whole story. In the same published interview, Senator Robert
248 "A maxim of statutory interpretation meaning that the expression of one
thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 521 (5th ed. 1979).
249 I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987) (quoting Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
250 To be sure, any reliance on, among other things, the caption of section 1411
("Jury Trials") as indicating authority for jury trials in the bankruptcy courts is severely misplaced. "[R]eliance on headings is not a favored method of statutory
construction. Section headings ... may be utilized to interpret a statute, if at all,
only where the statute is ambiguous." Scarborough v. Office of Personnel Management, 723 F.2d 801, 811-12 (11th Cir. 1982).
251 Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 306 (1988). See also United
States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985) (federal courts interpreting federal
statutes do not possess "a license . . . to rewrite language enacted by the
legislature").
252 "Most authorities now agree... and concluded section 1480 was repealed [by
BAFJA]." Bever & Cantrell, Jury Trials In The Bankruptcy Courts: Awaiting A Final
Verdict, 20 ST. MARY's L. J. 799, 807 (1989).
253 Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. 2782, 2789-90 n.3.
254 48 Bankr. 683 (Bankr E.D. Okla. 1985).
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Dole, another key figure in BAFJA's passage, indicated that the
enabling provision which would effectively repeal section 1480
should be deemed the controlling statute, and not the contradictory section which might appear to revive section 1480.255 Senator Dole then recommended that new section 1411 be read in pan
materia with the new section 157(b)(5) requirement that personal
injury and wrongful death cases be tried in the district court.2 5 6
The bankruptcy court in Jacobs v. O'Bannon (In re O'Bannon),25 7
finding Senator Dole's interpretation more logical, opined that
reading the two sections together suggested jury trials should
only be held in the district court. 258 Accordingly, Senator
DeConcini's remarks are seemingly at odds with, and also less
persuasive than, those of his colleague. Notably, a subsequent
bill, proposed to make technical corrections to BAFJA, did nothing to reinstate the broad jury trial language of the former section 1480; a point one bankruptcy court deemed "most
25 9
important."
Moreover, the deference given to Senator DeConcini's post
facto comments ignores the significance of contemporaneous
floor statements made by key House members in securing
BAFJA's passage. 2 6 The perception that the supposed neglect
of Congress to incorporate the jury trial prohibition of the Model
Emergency Rule into the 1984 Amendments was a grant of permission to continue section 1480 is shattered by examining the
Congressional Record for the House of Representatives.
In its legislative genesis, BAFJA was embodied in the House
bill entitled H.R. 5174.261 Critical to its evolution was the addition of the Kastenmeier-Kindness amendment, named after the
two Representatives who played a pivotal role in BAFJA's struggle to become law. The Kastenmeier-Kindness Amendment was
significant in that it promulgated much of the present day juris255 Jacobs v. O'Bannon (In re O'Bannon), 49 Bankr. 763, 767 n.1 1 (Bankr. M.D.
La. 1985)(citing American Bankruptcy Institute Newsletter Vol. III, No. 3 (Winter 1884/
1985)).
256 Id. at 768 n.14.
257 Id.
258 Id. This would be consistent with the enunciated policy of the Supreme Court
that in reviewing a statute, a court should not be guided by a single sentence, but
should look "to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy." Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987).
259 In re Tripplett, 115 Bankr. 955, 959 n.6 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990).
260 See generally 130 CONG. REC. H 1846-49 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1984) (remarks of
Rep. Kastenmeier).
261 H:R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
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dictional scheme that eventually permitted the 1984 Amendments to be enacted as a compromise bill.262
In bringing his proposal to the house floor, Representative
Kastenmeier noted the amendment was "virtually identical" to
the Model Emergency Rule and was essentially a codification
2 64
thereof.2 6 3 Representative Kindness echoed his co-sponsor

and encouraged his colleagues "to add the endorsement of Congress" to the Model Emergency Rule.265
These excerpts clearly indicate the intent of BAFJA's major
proponents in the House to enact the Model Emergency Rule in
toto and thereby include in the new law the prohibition against
jury trials in the bankruptcy courts. So observed the court in Bokum Resources Corp. v. Long Island Lighting Co. (In re Bokum Resources
Corp.).266 Based on the House remarks, Bankruptcy Judge Gueck
concluded that section 1480 did not survive BAFJA, and the new
section 1411 merely preserves the jury trial right for personal injury tort and wrongful death claims. 2 6 ' Turning to the alleged
exclusion of the jury trial prohibition, the court opined that Congress must have determined it was not necessary to address the
jury trial issue because the 1984 Amendments already contained
a restrictive jurisdictional provision.268
The foregoing analysis of BAFJA's history by the Bokum Resources Corp. court lends weight to observations, such as that made
by District Judge Sweet, that he was "persuaded that, had Con262 See 1 app. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1663, 1686-88 (15th ed. 1990) (legislative
history of BAFJA). Representative Kastenmeier stated "my amendment has been at
work in the last 18 months under the emergency bankruptcy rule . . . . It has
proven successful. Nothing need be changed. Congressional enactment of the
[Model Emergency] rule is the purpose of my amendment, and that is all that is
necessary." 130 CONG. REC. H1846 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1984) (remarks of Rep.
Kastenmeier).
263 Id. at H1849.
264 Id. at H1847 (remarks of Rep. Kindness).
265 Id.
266 49 Bankr. 854, 864 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1985).
267 Id. at 866-67.
268 The court stated:
Congress demonstrated its capacity to draft a statute which applied to
all types of issues when it felt such a statute was necessary .... Congress must have concluded it was unnecessary to include an all-inclusive jury right statute in the 1984 [Amendments] due to the nore
restrictive jurisdictional grant which that Act contains.
Id. at 868. See also Cameron v. Anderson (In re American Energy, Inc.), 50 Bankr.
175, 180 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985) ("Congress by striking the broader language of section 1480(a) from section 1411(a) left bankruptcy courts with a strong suggestion
that the only right to trial by jury that is retained" is for personal injury tort and
wrongful death actions).
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gress specifically addressed the jury issue, it would have explicitly
withdrawn jury proceedings to the district court.

' 269

In sum, all

the foregoing clearly demonstrates that any statutory basis for
the bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials no longer exists.27 °
B.

Rectifying The Jury Trial Rule Dilemma

Another focal point of the instant controversy has been the
jury trial rule, as embodied in the now abrogated Bankruptcy
Rule 9015. The genesis of this issue was a continued misapplication of the original jury trial provision, as promulgated in 1983.
For this reason, the chronology of the 1983 Bankruptcy Rules'
formulation demands scrutiny. No less an authority than Professor Countryman has noted the Advisory Committee has virtually
completed working on the rules before Marathon was decided and
the committee did not consider that decision or the events leading to the enactment of the 1983 Rules. 27 ' The timing of events
certainly bears this assertion out.
The first step was taken on February 12, 1982, via the transmittal of the Preliminary Draft of Proposed Bankruptcy Rules
from the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference. 272 The Preliminary Draft was disseminated to the bench
and bar with three dates set for public hearings; the last hearing
to be held onJune 24-25, 1982. August 1, 1982 was established
as a deadline for the submission of written comments.2 73 The
Marathon decision was released on June 28, 1982, subsequent to
269 Pied Piper Casuals, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, 72 Bankr. 156, 160 n.5
(S.D.N.Y. 1987). "It can generally be said then, that under existing law, the bankruptcy court has authority to exercise full district court jurisdiction over those matters that historically were not tried by jury; andthat it lacks full authority regarding
those matters that historically were triable byjury." Pro Machine, Inc. v. Hardinge
Bros., Inc. (In re Pro Machine, Inc.), 87 Bankr. 998, 1000-01 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988)
(footnote omitted). The court went on to say "more likely than not it was the intent
of Congress in enacting 28 U.S.C. section 157 that bankruptcy courts would not
conduct jury trials." Id. at 1001.
270 Accord Friedman v. Gold Advice, Inc. (In re Fort Lauderdale Hotel Partners,
Ltd.), 103 Bankr. 335, 336 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989) (Section 1480 has been repealed,
and its successor, section 1411, "is far more restrictive.").
271 Countryman, supra note 41, at 27.
272 Letter from Circuit Judge Aldisert, Chairman of the Advisory Committee, to
District Judge Gignoux, Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 92 F.R.D. 510 (Feb. 12, 1982).
273 Letter from District Judge Gignoux, Chairman of the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure, to the bench and bar (March 1, 1982), 92 F.R.D.
509 (Mar. 1, 1982).
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all of the public hearings and barely a month before the end of
the written commentary period.
The Preliminary Draft's only explicit post facto reference to
Marathon was made in an August 9, 1982 letter from Circuit
Judge Aldisert, Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules, to District Judge Gignoux, Chairman of the Judicial
Conference's rules committee. 274 The letter stated that the rules
had been drafted in order to accommodate any future congressional amendments to the bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction necessitated by Marathon.275
The United States Supreme Court approved the new Rules
and transmitted them to Congress on April 25, 1983.276 Preoc-

cupied with an internal political battle over the enactment of new
bankruptcy legislation addressing Marathon, Congress took no
action and the new Bankruptcy Rules took effect on August 1,
1983.277

The implication of the foregoing chain of events is clear.
The Preliminary Draft of the 1983 Bankruptcy Rules, and virtually all of the commentary directed thereto, came into being well
before Marathon was decided. As to the singular reference to
Marathon in Judge Aldisert's letter,278 given the extremely short
gap in time between Marathon and the date of that letter, it would
be difficult to posit that the 1983 Rules had taken full cognizance
of Marathon, especially with respect to the jury trial rule. To be
sure, Judge Aldisert's letter informed the Judicial Conference
that the Bankruptcy Rules were intended to accommodate future
amendments necessitated by Marathon. Yet this falls somewhat
short of vilifying Rule 9015 as comporting with Marathon. If anything, a more rational reading of the Advisory Committee letter
would be to interpret it as stating that the new Rules, as rules of
procedure, were not so confined that they could not be adapted
to future amendments of the Bankruptcy Code." 9 Indeed, the
274 Letter from Circuit Judge Aldisert, Chairman of the Advisory Committee, to
District Judge Gignoux, Chairman of the Committee on Rule of Practice and Procedure (Aug. 9, 1982), reprinted in 1 COLLIER, ON BANKRUvrCY 1240 (15th ed. 1987).
275 Id.
276 Order of the Supreme Court, 97 F.R.D. 57 (Apr. 25, 1983).

277 See id.

278 See Letter from Judge Aldisert, supra note 272, at 1242.
279 Consider also that, in the Preface to the Preliminary Draft for the 1983 Bankruptcy Rules, the Advisory Committee stated "[t]here is a greater possibility for
jury trials under the Code than under the [repealed] Act," and made reference to
former section 1480. 92 F.R.D. 514, 518. Since this implies the jury trial rule was
promulgated in reliance upon that statute, the repeal of section 1480 as discussed
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letter did intimate that the 1983 Rules should not be read with a
mindfulness of the restrictive parameters set forth in Marathon.
Moreover, the fact that neither Congress nor the Supreme
Court chose to act on the 1983 Rules is not dispositive with respect to the jury trial rule: the text of Bankruptcy Rule 9015 is
wholly unchanged from its first recital in the Preliminary Draft,
made months before Marathon. This clearly refutes the assertion
made by some courts that "these Rules were promulgated by the
Supreme Court and were allowed by Congress to become law
28 0
without change well after Marathon and the Emergency Rules.What is perhaps the more accurate answer, one which the previous statement overlooks, is that the Supreme Court and Congress saw no need to change rules of procedure to deal with the
substantive issues of Marathon. Most certainly, the Court could
not have foreseen the utilization of a procedural device such as
Rule 9015 as a substantive basis to bestow upon bankruptcy
judges the power to conduct jury trials. Indeed, the aforementioned letter of Circuit Judge Aldisert most likely contemplated a
28
similar belief. '
Significant here were two court of appeals decisions upholding the validity of the 1983 Rules. Utilizing the "unmistakable
clarity" standard of Hanna v. Plumer, 282 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit presumed the new Bankruptcy
Rules were constitutional in Salomon v. Kaiser (In re Kaiser).2s5 The
court thought it was unlikely that the United States Supreme
Court would have promulgated rules of procedure for the bankruptcy and district courts if Marathon had invalidated the jurisdiction of both courts.2 8 4 Noteworthy here is that, the appellant's
argument was directed at the jurisdiction of both the bankruptcy
courts and the district courts 28 5 and the court framed its response
in the conjunctive, joining both lower courts under the penumpreviously herein appears to be exactly the type of future amendment necessitated
by Marathon that Judge Aldisert stated the Bankruptcy Rules were intended to accommodate. Given this avowed flexibility of the Rules, one way the issue might be
reconciled is by viewing Rule 9015 as no longer applicable to the bankruptcy courts
since its statutory basis, section 1480, was repealed subsequent to the promulgation
of the Rules.
280 McCormick v. American Investors Management, Inc. (In re McCormick), 67
Bankr. 838, 843, (D. Nev. 1986).
281 See Letter from Judge Aldisert, supra note 272.
282 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965).
283 722 F.2d 1574, 1579 (2d Cir. 1983).
284 Id.
285 Id. at 1576.

1991]

JURY TRIALS

307

bra of its findings.286
In Frank v. Arnold (In re Morrissey),28 7 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit overruled the district court's referral of a bankruptcy court appeal to a United States Magistrate.288 Concluding its directions on remand to the district
court, the tribunal opined on the standard of review contained in
new Bankruptcy Rule 8013.289 In dicta, Circuit Judge Aldisert
posited that, regarding any conflict between the new rule and the
model rule, the new rule must control. 290 The Third Circuit stipulated that any procedural rules, as distinguished from jurisdictional, must yield to the new Bankruptcy Rules. 29 '
Analyzing the above, the Second Circuit in Kaiser viewed the
1983 Rules as valid when applied to both the article III district
court and the bankruptcy court. In no manner did the Kaiser
Court address the validity of the Rules when applied to the bankruptcy courts in isolation, nor did it endeavor to segregate the
availability of any single rule to one forum or the other. Obviously, no one could realistically question the ability of the article
III district court to conduct a jury trial. Kaiser, therefore, offers
no comfort to those seeking to employ it to validate Rule 9015,
as the decision addressed the two lower courts in unison.
The Morrissey decision, while correct in its holding that new
procedural rules must overcome any predecessors, is troublesome because it was subsequently victimized by misinterpretation. One cannot argue with Circuit Judge Aldisert's analysis of
the 1983 Rules in their true state as procedural provisions. It was
the later extrapolation by some courts of Rule 9015 into a rule of
substance that led to the Advisory Committee's criticism in the
1987 Committee Note abrogating the rule. By taking task with
those who misused the jury trial rule as the basis for a substantive
right, the 1987 Advisory Committee verifies as correct Morrissey 's
treatment of the 1983 Rules as procedural devices and nothing
more.
The foregoing evolution demonstrates that the courts which
used Kaiser and Morrissey as a springboard to interpret Rule 9015
286
287
288
289

Id. at 1579.
717 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 101.
Id. at 104.

290

Id.

291

Id. at 105.
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as giving bankruptcy courts the power to conduct jury trials 29 2
were incorrect.29 3 In expressing its dismay at the use of Rule
9015 for substantive purposes and noting that any rules must not
abridge, enlarge or modify a substantive right, the Advisory
Committee Note of 1987 clearly sets itself against such
positions.294

The abrogation of Rule 9015 was a considered and well reasoned step by the judicial branch to end the controversy over the
power to conduct jury trials in the bankruptcy courts. The position finally adopted by the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy
Rules, as approved by the Supreme Court and Congress, recognized the need to withdraw the procedural basis for a jury trial
power adhering in bankruptcy judges. Bankruptcy Judge
Schwartzberg phrased it well in New Castle Associates v. KrausThomson Organization,Ltd. (In re McCorhill Publishing, Inc.)295 when
he declared that the abrogation of Rule 9015 likewise banished
any claim that bankruptcy courts still retained some vestigial
power to conduct jury trials.296 The court stated the proposition
correctly in recognizing that the withdrawal of the procedural
jury trial rule reflected the "Congressional initiative" to foreclose
jury trials in the bankruptcy courts.297 Indeed, the identical findings of the Hughes-Bechtol opinion 291 lend further support to the
validity of this proposition.
Contrast the foregoing to the long stretch made by the court
in Price-Watson Co. v. Amex Steel Corp. (In re Price-Watson Co.),29
where it asserted that the abrogation of Rule 9015 merely left the
question open for future judicial resolution. 3° Such a view simply does not do justice to the clear intent of the Advisory Com292 See, e.g., Nashville Bank & Trust Co. v. Armstrong (In re River Transp. Co.), 35
Bankr. 556 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983).
293 Propositions such as that stated in Robinson v. Hinkley (In re Hinkley), 58
Bankr. 339, 344 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986), that "the Supreme Court, in promulgating Rule 9015, must adhere to the view that there is a substantive right to a jury
trial in the bankruptcy court," and assertions like that made by Bankruptcy Judge
Bason in Blackman v. Seton (In re Blackman), 55 Bankr. 437, 440 (Bankr. D.D.C.
1985), that "[tihe Bankruptcy Rules expressly vest power to conduct jury trials in
the bankruptcy court" must fall before this analysis.
294 See Advisory Committee Note, 114 F.R.D. 392 (1987).
295 90 Bankr. 633 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
296 Id. at 636.
297 Id.
298 See Hughes-Bechtol v. Air Enter. Inc. (In re Hughes-Bechtol, Inc., 107 Bankr.
552, 571 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989).
299 66 Bankr. 144 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986).
300 Id. at 152.
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mittee in its abrogation of the rule. Undeniably, the Committee
sought to end, once and for all, the fragmented case law that fueled the controversy for so many years. The Price-Watson interpretation serves only to propagate inconsistent holdings, not
bring about a decisive ruling.
Indeed, the black letter text of the Advisory Committee
Note3 1' tells us, in no uncertain terms, that the statutory basis for
jury trials in bankruptcy court, former section 1480, no longer
exists.30 2 Its replacement, section 1411, and its companion, section 157(b)(5), are severely circumscribed as to where ajury trial
should be held, and for what precise causes of action. 3 It also
recognized the historical abuse of Rule 9015 as a substantive device. 3° It is certainly an arduous task to argue that, in abrogating
the jury trial rule, the Advisory Committee countenanced bankruptcyjudges possessing the power to preside over jury trials. If
anything, the Advisory Committee Note demands the opposite
conclusion.
To be sure, the Advisory Committee Note recognized the
possibility of a future decision defining a right to a jury trial in
bankruptcy matters. Crucial here is the fact that the language of
the Note speaks of a right to a jury trial, not the power of the bankruptcy court to conduct a jury trial. 30 ' The better view of that
statement is to interpret it as foreseeing a possible future rule
change responsive to an as yet undefined jury trial right;3 0 6 not as
anticipating some grant of authority to the bankruptcy courts to
conduct jury trials.
Indeed, the choice of words in the Marathon opinion should
dispel any doubt whatsoever that the Court does not consider the
article I bankruptcy judges to be empowered to preside over jury
proceedings. Recall also that the Advisory Committee Note
points out that the jury trial rule was abrogated because it violated the statutory prohibition that the rules7 could not "abridge,
30
enlarge, or modify any substantive right.In short, the jury trial rule, as originally promulgated in
114 F.R.D. 193, 392 (1987).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
306 This writing does not address the controversy over the right to a jury trial in
bankruptcy matters, as that ongoing controversy has evolved since the seminal case
of Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
307 114 F.R.D. 193, 392 (1987) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2075).
301

302
303
304
305
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1983, was a procedural device run amok. Recognizing this misuse of Rule 9015 as a substantive basis for investing a jury trial
power in bankruptcy judges, the courts, and Congress, after careful deliberation, abrogated the Rule. Certainly, it was felt that
nothing less than the total elimination of the jury trial rule would
provide relief. This critical development speaks mightily against
any assertion that bankruptcy judges are today empowered to
conduct jury trials.
C. Not All Article I Courts Are Created Equal
A temptation several courts have succumbed to in finding
authority for jury trials before bankruptcy judges is to make a
favorable comparison between bankruptcy tribunals and their article I relations, the United States Magistrates. While both adjudicative bodies are alike, in that they are legislative, non-article
III courts, crucial differences abound, making them non-coordinate bodies. Primarily, the distinctions lie in the fact that one,
the magistrates enjoy well-defined statutory authority for, inter
alia, undertaking ajury trial, and two, such grant ofjurisdiction is
carefully circumscribed.
As a rule, magistrates possess only limited powers. 30 8 Their

ability to conduct misdemeanor trials 30 9 is subject to the accused
giving written consent to the waiver of his absolute right to be
tried by the district court.31 0 Consent of the parties is required
for a magistrate to serve as a special master"1 ' or to conduct a
proceeding in a jury matter.3 12 Moreover, the voluntariness of
3 13
the parties' consent in such instances is carefully protected.

This matter of explicit statutory authorization to the magistrates was seized upon by District Judge Winder in American Com-

munity Services, Inc. v. Wright Marketing, Inc. (In re American
Community Services, Inc. ).3 4 The court found that unlike the article
I magistrates, Congress had not statutorily delegated to bank308 See Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 712 F.2d
1305 (9th Cir. 1983), reconsidered and remanded, 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc)
(Kennedy, J.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984), for a discussion of the many restrictions on the exercise of the article III judicial power by article I magistrates.
309 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(3) (1988).
310 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b) (1988).
31" 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (1988).
312 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1988).
313 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) (1988). See Comment, Magistrate Trials: The New Hierarchy of Class 2 Adjuncts and Article IIIJudges, 58 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 559, 559 (1984) (the
statute "sets forth procedures to ensure that no litigant is coerced to consent").
314 86 Bankr. 681 (D. Utah 1988).
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ruptcyjudges the authority to preside over jury trials.3 15 The district court contrasted the lack of express power for the
bankruptcy court to conduct jury trials to the statutory mandate
given magistrates to do so.316 Moreover, Judge Winder pointed
out that the United States Supreme Court explicitly upheld the
magistrate provisions of the Judicial Code as constitutional because the system of reference provided for the district court's
maintaining ultimate authority over final decisions.3 1i
As aforementioned, the court in Weeks v. Kramer (In re G.
Weeks Securities Inc.)31" also found the lack of parallel statutory authority fatal to any comparison of bankruptcy court jury trials to
those before a magistrate.31 9 Among other things, Bankruptcy
Judge Brown noted the dissimilarity in appellate review between
decisions rendered by magistrates and those issued by bankruptcy judges.32 °
To be sure, this article III concern continues to play a role in
proscribing the permissible scope of action allowed a magistrate.
Consider, for example, Ford v. Estelle,32 ' where the Fifth Circuit
found that the Magistrate's Act, specifically 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B), does not permit district courts to refer prisoner
civil rights actions to magistrates for jury trial because such a trial
-involves fact-finding intrinsically incapable of review de novo. ' '3 22
Clearly, the matter of appellate review is vital in ascertaining the
limits of authority of any article I court; be it the magistrates or
the bankruptcy courts.
A key illustration of the tension between the article I magistrates and the article III courts is the United States Supreme
Court's pronouncement in Gomez v. United States. s23 The principal
question, wrote Justice Stevens, was the ability of a magistrate to
preside at the selection of a jury in a felony trial without the defendant's consent. 324 In Gomez, the magistrate exercised the full
gamut of jury selection powers: questioning the veniremen, instructing them on points of law, the charged offenses, various
presumptions and burdens, and, lastly, admonishing the panel
315
316

Id. at 688.
Id. at 689.

Id. (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980)).
89 Bankr. 697 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1988).
Id. at 714.
Id. at 715.
740 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 380-81.
109 S.Ct. 2237 (1989).
324 Id. at 2239.
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
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not to discuss the case with anyone.
Finding that the performance of such tasks exceeded the
statutory authority of the magistrate, the Court stated that if the
magistrate were to conduct the jury selection, "we harbor it
would raise serious doubts about the district judge's ability to
provide meaningful review.- 26 Quite simply, Justice Stevens expressed the view that the exercise of this power by the article I
magistrate was too important to be left to a secondary review by
the article III district judge.3 27 As for the permissibility of such
an undertaking being accorded by statute, the Court held that the
lack of a specific reference to jury selection in the magistrate statutes or their legislative history was persuasive that Congress did
not intend for the legislatively mandated magistrates to perform
this function. 28
Certainly, any comparison of the power of magistrates to
that of bankruptcy judges in seeking jury trial authority for the
latter is a suspect, if not dangerous, exercise. While both tribunals share article I status, they diverge in terms of their explicitly
legislated authorization. Magistrates benefit from clearly defined
provisions upon which to ground the exercise of their judicial
functions. Moreover, this body of law is most certainly subject to
various constitutional limitations, pursuant to the omnipresent
article III.
As demonstrated, bankruptcy courts have no such foundation to build upon. "It is undisputed that [b]ankruptcy [c]ourts
have no such express statutory authority" as do magistrates for
conducting jury trials, as noted by Chief Bankruptcy Judge Kahn
in Poissonnerie La Belle Maree, Inc. v. Johnson (In re Johnson). 2 9
Moreover, judicial decisions, particularly the Supreme Court's in
Gomez v. United States,33 evince a clear intent by the Supreme
Court to maintain a firm grip on any utilization of article III powers by magistrates. Already weakened by the lack of parallel statutory authority, the bankruptcy court should be considered to be
at least as proscribed from conducting jury trials as their fellows
on the magistrate bench.
Id.
Id. at 2247. In a pragmatic footnote, Justice Stevens noted that even supposing a meaningful review by the district judge was possible, "the time consumed by
such review would negate time initially saved by the delegation." Id. at 2247 n.29.
327 See id. at 2247.
328 Id.
329 115 Bankr. 712, 715 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1990).
330 109 S.Ct. 2237 (1989).
325
326

1991]

JURY TRIALS

313

D. The Supreme Court Speaks To Article III
Once again, any proper analysis of this controversy brings us
back to the seminal holding of Marathon. Notwithstanding the
difficulties some courts had with Marathon, a comprehensive
reading of that decision refutes any notion that the Court intended anything other than that the right to preside over a jury
trial was an "essential attribute" of the judicial power in which
the non-article III bankruptcy court could not share. At the outset, the opinion catalogued the powers vested in the bankruptcy
courts by the 1978 Code, including, inter alia, the power to preside over jury trials."' "The inexorable command" of article III,
opined the Court, is that the collective judicial power of the
United States must be exercised by judges enjoying the cherished
protections of article III: namely lifetime tenure and undiminished compensation while in office." 2
With this foundation in place, the Court turned to the question of whether the 1978 Act violated article III's command that
the United States judicial power "be vested in courts whose
judges enjoy the protections and safeguards specified in that
[a]rticle."' 3 33 The Court answered that question with an unequivocal "yes," finding the new Bankruptcy Code vested all of the
"essential attributes" of the judicial power in the "adjunct" bankruptcy courts. 3 31 The opinion specified that the bankruptcy court
was exercising all the ordinary powers of the district court, which
included presiding over jury trials, 335 and that this was an exercise of powers far greater than those lodged in other adjunct
courts as approved by the Court in earlier decisions." 6 To be
sure, the repeated, detailed references to the jury trial power as
33' Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 55
(1982).
332
333

Id. at 58-59.
Id. at 62.

334

Id. at 84-85.

335

Id. at 85.

Id. at 86 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) and United States v.
Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980)). Furthermore, the Court explained in a footnote
that "exercise of the judicial power must be met at all stages of [the] adjudication,"
taking heed of the fact that a case is "shaped at the trial level." Id. at 86 n.39. This
would appear to refute statements such as "a jury is a jury, no matter who presides
over the trial." Price-Watson Co. v. Amex Steel Corp. (In re Price-Watson Co.), 66
Bankr. 144, 159 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986). See also George Woloch Co. v. Longview
Capital Plastic Pipe, Inc. (In re George Woloch Co.), 49 Bankr. 68, 70 (E.D. Pa.
1985) ("The notion that a jury trial is likely to produce a different result depending
upon whether the presiding judge is a district court or a bankruptcy judge seems
far-fetched").
336
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SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 21:258

an "essential attribute" make it clear that Marathon stands for the
proposition that the bankruptcy courts, as article I courts, cannot
conduct jury trials. Further pronouncements by the Court have
only strengthened the force of these statements.
Subsequent to the passage of BAFJA, the United States
Supreme Court has twice returned to the article III concerns so
vital to the Court's opinion in Marathon. In Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co. ,337 the Court held that arbitration of
matters arising under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act by an administrative agency did not contravene article III.38 In so doing, the Court noted it had long recognized
that Congress retains the authority to vest decision-making
power in non-article III tribunals.3 3 9 Specifically referring to
Marathon, the Court observed that the divided Court held "only
that Congress may not vest in a non-[a]rticle III court the power
to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue binding orders in
a traditional contract action arising under state law, without consent of the litigants, and subject only to ordinary appellate review. ' 3' 4 0 Indeed, such a statement would appear to go to the
very heart of both Marathon and BAFJA.
A crucial post-Marathon pronouncement by the Court on the
issue may be gleaned from its decision in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor.3 4 1 The direct issue, as framed by the
Court, was whether the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Commission) was empowered to entertain state law counterclaims in reparation proceedings and, if so, whether that grant
of authority violated article 111.342 As could well be expected,
such an article III inquiry necessitated due consideration of Marathon and its statements on the essential attributes of the article
III judicial power.343
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor acknowledged
that in these matters the Court had focused upon, inter alia, the
extent to which the essential attributes of the judicial power are
reserved to the article III courts and, conversely, the extent to
which the non-article III forum exercises the powers normally
337 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
338
339
340
341
342
343

Id. at 594.
Id. at 583.
Id. at 584.
478 U.S. 833 (1986).
Id. at 835-36.
Id.. at 841-59.
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vested solely in the article III courts.344 Ruling that the investiture of certain limited powers in the Commission did not violate
this test, the opinion made comparisons between Marathon and
the instant case. 45 Germane to this discussion was the finding
that the Commission's enabling legislation left far more of the
essential attributes of the judicial power with article III courts
than had the provision of the Bankruptcy Act that was found unconstitutional in Marathon.346
Interestingly, both the Thomas and Schor opinions were written by Justice O'Connor, who had filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in Marathon. Readers of these three
opinions would do well to bear in mind the implicit warning in
Schor that the Court would not tolerate the creation of an entire
body of non-article III courts empowered to conduct the business of article III courts.3 4 7
The import of the foregoing is clear. By classifying the ability to preside over jury trials as one of the essential attributes of
the judicial power, Schor, like Marathon, demonstrates that power
is normally reserved to the article III courts and not one easily
transferable to an article I forum. Critical to the Commission's
ability in Schor to pass muster under article III scrutiny was the
fact that the power to preside over jury trials was not vested in it.
Moreover, Justice O'Connor's opinion confirms the language of
Marathon on the jury trial issue by pointing out the Bankruptcy
Code as first promulgated impermissibly vested the power to
conduct jury trials, an "essential attribute," in the bankruptcy
courts. It would be sheer folly to simply ignore such a specific
reference to the jury trial issue as made by the Supreme Court in
Schor. Indeed, the fact that the Schor Court selected the power to
preside over jury trials from among the other powers catalogued
in Marathon is at the least highly indicative of a continued belief
by the United States Supreme Court that the bankruptcy courts
do not have the power to conduct jury trials. To state otherwise
Id. at 851.
Id. at 851-52.
346 Id. at 852. In Schor's most telling point on the jury trial issue, Justice
O'Connor concluded this portion of the discussion by stating "the [Commission],
unlike the bankruptcy courts under the 1978 Act, does not exercise "all ordinary
powers of district courts," and thus may not, for instance, preside overjury trials or
issue writs of habeas corpus." Id. at 853 (citing Marathon, 458 U.S. at 85).
347 Id. at 855. In addition, Justice O'Connor stated that Article III acts to safeguard the "institutional interests" of our tripartite system, negating any preclusive
effect of a party's consent to, or waiver of, jurisdiction. Id. at 850-51.
344
345
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today creates a serious risk of running afoul of both Marathon and
Schor.
On a related judicial front, consider that Justice Kennedy
may also be keenly interested in the article III issues raised by the
comparison of bankruptcy court jury trial authority to the existing jury trial power of federal magistrates. Prior to his elevation to the Court, Justice Kennedy authored the en banc decision
of the Ninth Circuit in Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America, Inc. v.
Instromedix, Inc. 48 The upshot of then-Circuit Judge Kennedy's
writing clearly shows him to be a staunch defender of article III
against any supposed encroachment by tribunals created via legislative fiat.
In deciding the constitutionality of provisions of the Federal
Magistrate Act of 1979,- 49 judge Kennedy posited that the qualities of article III judges which make them a separate and independent judiciary "are present constitutional necessities, not
relics of antique ideas." 0 The judge continued that the independent character of judgments entered under article III
granted such judgments well known qualities of authority and respect. 351 Bypassing arguments regarding the consent of parties
to non-article III adjudication, the court emphasized that the true
issue was the transfer to another forum of article III jurisdiction:
a protective component of the constitutional structure which cannot be waived by the parties.352
Notably making extensive usage of Marathon,JudgeKennedy
held that for the independent role of the judiciary to be preserved, "there must be both the appearance and the reality of
control by [a]rticle III judges. '3 5 3 Further, the Pacemaker court
ruled that the required control must exceed simple appellate review.354 Finding sufficient control of the magistrates under the
55
existing scheme, the court found no violation of article III.

348 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984). See supra note
308 and accompanying text.
349 Id. at 539.
350 Id. at 541.
35' Id.
352 Id. at 543-44.
353 Id. at 544.

354

Id.

Id. at 544-47. Interestingly, Judge Kennedy did find it of some importance
that the district court retained the power of contempt and noted that the "constitutional symmetry" of the magistrate statutes were detracted from by the inclusion of
article I bankruptcy judges in the Judicial Conference of the United States, the body
which determines the number of magistrates for each district, a key to "exclusive
judicial control." Id. at 545.
355
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Based upon the foregoing, it would seem that Marathon, and
the decisions which followed it, provide clear markings as to the
Court's views on article III, particularly as to the power of bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials. Particular note must be
taken of Justice O'Connor's active role in shaping this jurisprudence, and the views previously expressed by Justice Kennedy in
addressing article III concerns. From all of this, we must conclude the Court would respond in the negative to any assertion of
jury trial power by bankruptcy judges.
E. Resolving the Circuit Conflict
Ultimately, we come to the present embodiment of the controversy over the power of the bankruptcy courts to conduct jury
trials. A controversy fueled by the decision of the Second Circuit
in Ben Cooper, and, standing in contradistinction, the decisions of
the Eighth Circuit in United Missouri Bank and the Tenth Circuit in
Kaiser Steel. It is here that we see the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has forged a course difficult to support, and subject to sharp criticism.
Initially, the scope of the Second Circuit's ruling seems
overly broad. It would appear that the issue presented before the
Ben Cooper court was limited to the core/non-core determination
of the underlying action to ultimately decide whether an entitlement to ajury trial existed, not whether there was an entitlement
to a jury trial in a bankruptcy court. It is not entirely clear as to
the linkage between those matters and the panel's holding.
Turning to the substance of the decision, few would argue
that the Second Circuit was unjustified in finding the
Granfinancieradecision to be "opaque" in some respects. Yet it is
quite puzzling as to how the tribunal deciphered that supposedly
nebulous decision as containing various passages that supported
the conduct ofjury trials by bankruptcy judges. In fact, the statement in Ben Cooper that Granfinancieradoes not foreclose bankruptcy court jury trials can rightly be called unwarranted, for the
court extended reasoning it had already decried as unclear as the
basis for finding that substantial authority resided in the bankruptcy court. One could well agree that, rather than venture further out into the swift and unchartered currents of Granfinanciera,
the Second Circuit should have retreated to higher ground.
Likewise, Judge Timbers found virtually no guidance in section 1411, yet proceeded hastily from that vacuum to look elsewhere for some statutory authority In doing so, the court first
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looked to the classification of bankruptcy judges as judicial officers of the district court. To be sure, this is a provision whose
boundaries have yet to be fully tested. Second, this analysis
seems to assume too much in the mere labeling of the article I
bankruptcy judge as a judicial officer of the district court. Certainly, the boundaries between a non-article IIIjurist and the federal judiciary needs clearer definition than this reference
provides, if the strictures of article III are not to be offended.
Lastly, this point in Ben Cooper virtually ignores the other cases
where greater significance is attributed to the status of bankruptcyjudges as "units" of the district court; a significance not to
be overlooked in light of Marathon and its denouncement of the
pervasive authority given bankruptcy judges by the original 1978
enactment of the Code.
The Ben Cooper court next turned to section 157. It is suggested here that such an analysis is oversimplified, as it seems to
take the core jurisdiction authorized by the statute as an all-encompassing grant. As such, it fails to discriminate to a sufficient
degree the core/non-core dichotomy, and possibly reads too
much into the jurisdiction over core matters given the bankruptcy courts. Certainly, this is reminiscent of the defects found
by Marathon, which in turn precipitated the creation of the core/
non-core proceedings by the 1984 Amendments.
Lastly, the tribunal's virtual aloofness to the abrogation of
former Bankruptcy Rule 9015 is faulty. In condoning those decisions which substituted the general federal rules or local rules for
the non-existent Rule 9015 belies the importance of that amendment, and flies in the face of the basic spirit and intent of abrogating the jury trial rule in the first instance.
The flawed reasoning of the Second Circuit was exposed to a
high degree in United Missouri Bank. In its conservative approach,
the Eighth Circuit did not address the constitutional issues, finding the resolution of the statutory question a sufficient basis for
its decision. Still, the panel's ratio decendi provides a more than
adequate basis to support its finding that bankruptcy judges cannot conduct jury trials. From the outset, the tribunal properly
reminds us that Granfinancieradecided the right to a jury trial in
bankruptcy proceedings, but not the forum in which to exercise
that right. Unlike the Second Circuit, the United Missouri Bank
court refused to read into Granfinanciera some authority for the
conduct of jury trials by bankruptcy judges.
The Eighth Circuit provided some rather cogent observa-
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tions as to article I courts, and the bankruptcy courts in particular. As summarized by the court, no legislative authority existed
historically for bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials. In establishing this base line, the appellate court reminded that any assertion of jury trial authority residing in bankruptcy judges
represents a sharp change from the traditional, equitable role of
that bench. The panel then exposited the critically sequenced
events that engendered the jury trial controversy under the modem Bankruptcy Code.
Chief Judge Lay commenced with the apparent intention of
Congress in 1978 to grant bankruptcy judges pervasive jurisdiction, including the power to conduct jury trials, and the striking
down of this wide authority by the Supreme Court in Marathon.
Next, the United Missouri Bank panel asserted that the Supreme
Court did indeed consider the power to conduct jury trials to be
an "essential attribute" of the article III power, which it revoked
from the bankruptcy court in Marathon. In this author's view, that
is a point which can never be emphasized enough.
Lastly, the Eighth Circuit noted that BAFJA, as compelled by
Marathon, established the core/non-core dichotomy, and afortiori
deprived the bankruptcy court of any authority to conduct jury
trials. In particular here, the panel recognized that the restrictive
provisions of the 1984 Amendments are simply incompatible
with any notion that therein lies some statutory authority for article I bankruptcy judges to preside over jury trials.
Parenthetically, one should be reminded of the matter of the
reconstituted bankruptcy courts being labelled by BAFJA as a
"unit" of the district court. As emphasized in the Weeks and
Hughes-Bechtol decisions, the terminology of the 1984 Amendments lends further weight to the assertion that the article I
bankruptcy courts play a subservient role to the article III bench.
The inability of the former tribunal to exercise the full scope of
the judicial power is a key illustration of that inferior role, as
mandated by Marathon, and codified by BAFJA.
In this fashion, the circuit court very clearly established that
these events and their ordination were not mere happenstance.
Rather, they represent the initial investiture of a jury trial power
in the article I bankruptcy court, and then its revocation as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. The 1984 Amendments,
promulgated in response to Marathon, may not be properly interpreted as restoring that forbidden power, but only make sense
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when viewed as lacking authorization for jury trials before bankruptcy judges.
Moreover, ChiefJudge Lay emphasized that section 157 contains no express language granting bankruptcy judges the power
to conduct jury trials. Correctly observing that the. amendments
wrought by BAFJA speak only to the power of the district courts
to hear specific tort claims, the court compared these provisions
to the statutory authority of magistrates to preside over jury trials. The panel succinctly commented that Congress, as evidenced by the magistrate statutes, is plainly aware of what it need
enact in a statute to authorize an article Ijudge to conduct ajury
trial.
Because BAFJA failed to enact such language, the fact that
no expression of statutory authority for bankruptcy judges to
conduct jury trials exists anywhere is inescapable. By this reading, the court did fairness not only to the bankruptcy laws, but
also to its corollaries empowering similar, but not identical, article I courts.
Importantly, the Eighth Circuit also examined the law for
some implication of a bankruptcy jury trial power. As before,
however, it found none. Rejecting the analysis by the court below, the tribunal found the sparse legislative history of BAFJA
simply included no cognizable indication that Congress wished
to emplace jury trial authority in bankruptcy judges.
The panel was likewise correct in finding that Ben Cooper
made a "faulty syllogism," wherein the Second Circuit equated
the jury trial right with jury trial authority. The more rational
approach, employed by the United Missouri Bank court, was to
hold that Congress did not truly consider providing jury trial authority to bankruptcy judges. This interpretation does not bend
the statutory scheme in search of an implication of that jury trial
power, and comports with the apparent reaffirmation of the
strictly circumscribed scope of authority given the post-Marathon
bankruptcy judges.
Indeed, the Eighth Circuit is credited with the better perspective for its finding that an implied jury trial power is not necessary to effectuate the bankruptcy laws. Rightly so, the panel
held that the power to conduct jury trials is not "indispensable
and essential" to the intended function of a bankruptcy judge. In
this fashion, the court did not attempt to forcibly read into the
law some oppressive need for jury trial authority, and thus
avoided doing violence to the statutory language. Furthermore,
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the view of the Eighth Circuit is easily reconciled to the historical
role of the bankruptcy court as one of equity, a status which does
not consider the jury trial as indispensable to its proper function.
Little need be added by way of expositing the Tenth Circuit's decision in Kaiser Steel. Suffice to say, that tribunal's close
tracking of the Eighth Circuit's decision not only serves to reinforce its propriety, but also lends additional emphasis to its
stated rationale.
Like United Missouri Bank, the Kaiser Steel opinion refused to
tortuously wrest from the existing Code some statutory authority
for jury trials in bankruptcy court. Distancing itself from the Second Circuit on that point, the panel repeated the crucial role of
Marathon in coming to the conclusion that the present Code does
not, and could not, instill the article I bankruptcy bench with the
"essential attribute" of the article III jury trial power.
The Kaiser Steel court also looked to the fact that the present
enabling statutes speak to the personal power of bankruptcy
judges to hear cases, not juries. As the panel indicated, this
choice of language cannot be taken lightly. The clear conclusion
of the foregoing point is that Congress intended the judges of
the bankruptcy court,3 not
juries they might empanel, to hear and
56
decide controversies.

Moreover, the Tenth Circuit addressed the inherent problem of reviewability, should a jury be utilized as a fact finder in
bankruptcy proceedings. As Judge Tacha correctly noted, the
seventh amendment, in forbidding any re-examination of the
findings of the jury, unavoidably clashes with the bankruptcy
judge's statutory authority to determine the case. This is by itself
irreconcilable within the present bankruptcy infrastructure.
Clearly, the Kaiser Steel court believed this insurmountable difficulty foreclosed any possibility of jury trials in bankruptcy court.
Further, as the teachings of other cases have demonstrated,
this obstacle is only exacerbated on appellate review, where the
present de novo review provisions collide head-on with the historical unreviewability of any factual determinations by a jury. In
one commentary, District Judge (formerly Chief Bankruptcy
Judge) Conrad Cyr asserted that the interplay of the seventh
amendment's restrictions with article III's limitations on the del356 Notably, the circuit court comported very closely with the ruling of Bankruptcy Judge Brown in Weeks, where that court also recognized the overt significance of the assignment of adjudicative powers not to the bankruptcy courts, but to
its judges.
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judges posed
egation of judicial power to article I bankruptcy
3 57
"[t]he most severe constitutional problem.

This difficulty was fully exposited in Hughes-Bechtol. Bankruptcy Judge Waldron pointed out the irreconcilable clash between the seventh amendment's prohibition against a reexamination of facts found below by a bankruptcy court jury and
the statutory requirement for a review de novo, anecessity pursuant to article III. Quite correctly, that court avoided these "constitutional conflicts" by taking the only viable course open to it,
deciding bankruptcy judges cannot conduct jury trials. Taken in
sum, it is self-evident that those constitutional obstacles over the
appealability question strongly militate against any finding that
jury trials may proceed in bankruptcy court.
Lastly, the Tenth Circuit also brought to the fore the stunning dissimilarity between the enabling statutes for federal magistrates and those for bankruptcy judges. Due note should be
taken of the tribunal's concise statement that it was greatly compelled to find against jury trials in bankruptcy court, as Congress
did not legislate a statute permitting bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials symmetrical to the provision empowering magistrates to do so.
In sum, the positions taken by United Missouri Bank and Kaiser
Steel do much to resolve the erroneous findings of jury trial authority in bankruptcy courts, especially as exacerbated in Ben
Cooper. While their self-imposed limitation to address only the
statutory question may still leave the constitutional issue open,
the concise authority provided on the former issue is ample
enough to provide controlling authority for future decisions.
Moreover, the decisions as a whole provide an important contrast
to Ben Cooper, and a logical point of comparison for the United
States Supreme Court in reviewing the controversy.
357

Cyr, The Right To Trial By Jury In Bankruptcy: Which Judge Is To Preside? 63 AM.

BANKR. L.J. 53, 61 (1989). As summarized by Judge Cyr, the dilemma is this:

If the district court itself may not conduct a second jury trial, and may
not provide de novo review of the jury verdict, there seems to be no
escaping the fact that the district court will be found to have relinquished the judicial control constitutionally required to assure compliance with article III by permitting the bankruptcy judge to preside
at any seventh amendment jury trial. It seems likely as well that section 157(c)(1) itself would be transgressed in the absence of a right of
de novo review by the district court in such circumstances.
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The Portents of Granfinanciera
1.

The Majority Ruling

As exposited above, the Court rather bluntly refused to decide in Granfinancieraif bankruptcy judges possessed the power to
conduct jury trials. Nevertheless, in writing for the majority,Justice Brennan left a multitude of clear and convincing signs for
any who might travel this road again in search of an answer to the
instant controversy. When the Court once again embarks on the
jury trial issue, the teaching of Granfinancierawill be crucial.
Consider first the discussion in Granfinancieraregarding the
inability of Congress to alter any seventh amendment rights by
mere "taxonomic" change. Surely, this is evidence of the Court's
distaste for legislative intrusions upon constitutional guarantees,
via suspect reclassifications of causes of action or the shifting of
adjudicative responsibilities to a "specified court." At a minimum, such strong language strikes a cautionary note for those
inclined to believe article I bankruptcy judges may conduct jury
trials.
Of equal, if not more, importance is the high tribunal's warning that the legislature is limited in its power to place adjudicative authority in article I courts. In particular, the Granfinanciera
Court noted that the task of initial fact-finding cannot be freely
dispensed to non-article III bodies by Congress. In an oblique
reference to the original provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the
Court recognized that the foregoing was true even if Congress
labelled that legislative court an "adjunct" to the article III
bench. Is this a hint as to a similar disdain for the reconstituted
bankruptcy court as a "unit" of the federal court system?
Another signal is given in the unabashed criticism of section
1411; the sole remaining statutory provision relating to the jury
power question. Finding fault with both its language and its
"confused" legislative history, it would seem highly unlikely for
the Court to ever extensively rely upon such a nebulous provision as proper statutory authority for bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials, let alone expand the scope of that statute. The
more likely route would be for the Court to narrow the application of that provision, in view of its inherent weaknesses.
Lastly, the Court rested any doubt as to the status of
Granfinanciera,vis'-a-vis' the Court's prior decision in Schor, by explicitly holding that bankruptcy cases are unlike proceedings
before other article I tribunals, as creditors lack an alternative
forum to the bankruptcy court. In so ruling, the Court indicated
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the need for a greater level of constitutional protections in bankruptcy proceedings. To be sure, this finding comports with the
numerous statements in Schor, wherein the Court made plain its
intent to safeguard article III, and the essential attributes thereof,
including the power to conduct jury trials.
Although the Court did not explicitly decide if bankruptcy
judges are empowered to conduct jury trials, the majority was
unmistakably clear in its view that Congress was not free to create
legislative courts and then deposit in them adjudicative responsibilities. The Court stressed that the powers of the article III
courts are to be strictly safeguarded. The tenor of the Court's
opinion leads one to think that it would not at all favor the conduct of jury trials by bankruptcy judges. While Justice Brennan,
the author of both the seminal Marathon holding and
Granfinanciera,shall be absent and Justice Souter remains to be an
unknown quantity, it is suggested here that the overall matrix is
little changed, leading to the belief that this Court is unlikely to
differ much in its views from the panel in Granfinanciera.
2.

The Other Voices

While the foregoing analysis of the majority opinion in
Granfinanciera is certainly de riguer for this discussion, the other
voices heard in that opinion provide much insight into the inclinations of the high bench. In many ways, both the concurring
and dissenting opinions assist in the prognostication of what the
Court might hold when it decides whether bankruptcy courts may
conduct jury trials.
Justice Scalia, concurring in all but one part of the majority
opinion and concurring in the judgment, chose to focus upon the
"public rights" issues raised in the holding.3 5 8 Essentially, Justice Scalia took the view that Congress could permissibly assign
"to tribunals lacking the essential characteristics of [a]rticle III
courts" only those "public rights" which arise between the government and others."5 9 The Justice relied upon the language of
article III, opining that the Constitution unambiguously directs
that the judicial power to adjudicate legal controversies between
private parties cannot vest in federal court in a non-article III
tribunal.
In sum, Justice Scalia took a narrow view of what could be
358 109 S. Ct. at 2802 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
359 Id.
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assigned to the article I bankruptcy court, and insisted that legal
controversies are within the sole domain of the article III bench.
This would seem a clear signal that Justice Scalia considers the
non-article III bankruptcy tribunals to be excluded from deciding
causes of action grounded in law, per force delimiting the article
I bankruptcy judges to sitting as courts of equity.
Lest there by any doubt ofJustice Scalia's resolve to preserve
the sanctity of the "essential attributes" of the article III courts,
note well his comment that "judicial powers" is a term "now
drained of constant content," and his demand that "[t]his central
feature of the Constitution must be anchored in rules, not set
adrift." 3' The only sensible interpretation of the foregoing is
that Justice Scalia would most likely oppose article I bankruptcy
judges conducting jury trials, either as an unwarranted encroachment upon article III or because, as an equitable tribunal, it need
not sit with a jury.
The latter point might also be drawn with some comfort
from the dissent of Justice White. The theme of his opinion is
that bankruptcy courts are "by their very nature" courts of equity
where "a jury would be out of place."" '' Indeed, the dissent posited that requiring juries to be utilized in bankruptcy courts
would disrupt and unravel the congressionally created statutory
scheme.

'3 62

Justice White's thesis was grounded upon a conten-

tion that Congress had rightfully exercised its constitutional authority36 3 to define actions such as the one at issue in
Granfinancieraas being at the core of the bankruptcy bench's equitable jurisdiction, "triable in a bankruptcy court before a bankruptcy judge, and without a jury. '3 64 A fortiori, Justice White is
apparently of the view that a bankruptcy judge, sitting in equity,
is not authorized to empanel a jury.
Lastly, the dissent of Justice Blackmun, as joined by Justice
O'Connor, clearly follows the same path. The closing dissenters
repeatedly referred to the bankruptcy courts as "equitable tribunals" where jury trials are impermissible.3 6 5 Few could argue
Id. at 2805 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 2810 (White, J., dissenting).
362 Id. at 2812 (White, J., dissenting).
363 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 4. The constitution provides that Congress may
"establish ...uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies." Id.
364 Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2814 (White, J., dissenting).
365 Id. at 2817 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Indeed, Justice Blackmun described
the equitable tribunals that comprise the bankruptcy courts as both "special" and
"expert." Id. at 2817-18 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
360
361
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that it would be at all likely for Justice Blackmun or Justice
O'Connor to find that such an unmistakably equitable forum as
the bankruptcy court could empanel a jury.
In toto, it would seem clear that the Granfinanciera Court
would oppose jury trials in bankruptcy courts as being violative
of article

111.366

As this is very much the same court that shall

decide the controversy today, the ramifications are obvious.
G.

Beyond the Jury Trial Issue
1. The Bankruptcy Court-A Forum At Constitutional
Risk

As if the statutory and constitutional questions surrounding
the power of bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials were not
enough, that question, important as it may be standing alone,
may yet prove to be simply the key to a Pandora's Box of nightmarish repercussions for the entire existing scheme of bankruptcy jurisdiction. When and if the Court reviews the
correctness of the Ben Cooper decision, it may either take the Second Circuit to task, or, instead, vilify it on the other pervasive
jurisdictional issues raised by that panel.
Bear in mind that Ben Cooper, in addition to finding in favor
of jury trials in the bankruptcy court, intertwined its ratio decendi
with a broad interpretation of the "core" proceedings language
legislated by BAFJA. It is this core versus non-core dichotomy
that has been tremendously divisive throughout the bankruptcy
system since the 1984 Amendments were enacted. A wide and
deep chasm exists between the circuits which have addressed the
issue, with Ben Cooper now at the vanguard for those tribunals
favoring a widespread application of the core power, and a correspondingly narrow reading of Marathon. 6 7
Contrast the pervasive view of the Second Circuit with the
diametrically opposed stance of the Ninth Circuit in Piombo Corp.
v. Castlerock Properties (In re Castlerock Properties),368wherein the tribunal cautioned that any interpretation of BAFJA be tempered
366 Accord Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frates (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 109 Bankr. 968,
974 n.6 (Granfinancieradicta indicates the court would hold unconstitutional), remanded, 911 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1990).
367 Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1398-99. See Arnold Print Works, Inc. v. Apkin (In re
Arnold Print Works, Inc.), 815 F.2d 165, 168 (1st Cir. 1987), and Kelley v. Nodine
(In re Salem Mortgage Co.), 783 F.2d 626, 634 (6th Cir. 1986) (First and Sixth
Circuits adoption, of expansive views of bankruptcy court jurisdiction, similar to
that of Ben Cooper.)
368 781 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1986).
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by a conservative reading of Marathon, to the extent that courts
should not characterize proceedings as core whenever necessary
to avoid raising constitutional problems.3 69 Like a virus, this
clash of opinions has spread throughout the courts of appeals,
inviting the Supreme Court to resolve the disruptive jurisdictional conflict." 0
Interestingly, the Second Circuit's reliance on the "core"
proceeding language of BAFJA may prove to be its undoing.
Shortly after Ben Cooper was issued, the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit opined that Granfinanciera had cast doubt upon
the constitutionality of the authority of the bankruptcy courts. 37 ,
Postulating that the underlying assumption of the 1984 amendments was that article III was not violated by the non-article III
bankruptcy courts' resolution of core proceedings,372 Judge
Johnson found this assumption to be open to "serious question"
in light of Granfinancieraand its apparent adoption of the analysis
in Marathon.373
Worthy of contemplation is the unique commentary analogizing the instant situation to the medieval legend of the demise
of King Arthur, and opining that Ben Cooper may very well lead
"to a constitutional Camlan over the [a]rticle III limitations on
bankruptcy jurisdiction."3 74 Finding that "[e]ven a rather restrained reading of Granfinanciera leads to the conclusion that
Congress overstepped constitutional boundaries in investing
such broad jurisdiction in the bankruptcy court, ' 375 the authors
questioned the viability of Ben Cooper as an acceptable interpretation of the existing jurisdictional scheme. Indeed, as the champion of BAFJA, the Second Circuit "may have unintentionally set
up its worst defeat by baiting the Court to reaffirm Granfinanciera
in Marathon III [sic] - conclusively disarming the round table of
non-[a]rticle III bankruptcy judges and mortally wounding
369 Id. at 162. See Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1987),
and Southeastern Sprinkler Co., Inc. v. Meyertech Corp. (In re Meyertech Corp.),
831 F.2d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 1987) (evincing the Fifth and Third Circuits' inclinations
to a conservative reading of BAFJA, in the same vein as Castlerock Properties).
370 Indeed, Professor Gibson has characterized the core/non-core structure as
"difficult to apply and its validity under article III is arguable." Gibson, supra note
3, at 1054.
371 Gower v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Davis), 899 F.2d 1136, 1140 n.9 (11 th
Cir. 1990).
372
373
374

Id. at 1140.
Id. at 1140 n.9.

See Abrams & Lake, Constitutional Camlan: Can the Bankruptcy Act Survive? 204
N.Y.L.J. 3,(Aug. 29, 1990).
375 Id. at 27, col. 4.
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BAFJA. ' '3 76 Given that Supreme Court has of late taken an especially keen interest in bankruptcy issues,3 7 7 we may soon learn if
those authors correctly foretold the beginnings of a new legal
legend.3 78
While nearly everything about BAFJA is fraught with uncertainty, the one undisputed fact is that its controversial provisions
have invited further scrutiny by the Court. In attempting to alleviate the infirmities raised by Marathon, Congress has merely set
the stage for the next landmark decision. In fact, great note
should be taken of the comments made by Representative Hamilton Fish of New York at the time of BAFJA's passage in the
House of Representatives. Speaking with what may yet prove to
be an uncanny gift of prophecy, the Congressman voiced his belief that "the Supreme Court will have to confront the constitutionality of the course Congress has chose to take. . . . I am
convinced that a decision in a case which we may call Marathon
I" is coming.3 79 Certainly, the jury trial controversy has created
the opportunity for that prediction to come true.
2.

Article III Bankruptcy Judges-Oasis of Relief or Just a
Mirage?

It would seem that in this post-Granfinanciera(and, possibly,
pre-Marathon II) era, the bankruptcy system has come full circle
to once again ask if bankruptcy judges should be accorded article
III status. As demonstrated in the foregoing, the oppressive jury
376

Id.

377 The Court decided five bankruptcy-related cases during its 1989-90 term an exceptionally high number for a single term." 2 BANKR. L. REP. (BNA) 745
(Aug. 9, 1990).
378 The resolution of the jury trial issue may also impact on the question of the
bankruptcy judge's power to punish for contempt. In Plastiras v. Idell (In re Sequoia Auto Brokers, Ltd., Inc.), 827 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1987), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided that the bankruptcy courts have no express or
implied civil contempt power. The panel held that "a bankruptcy court has no necessity to invoke an inherent contempt power to vindicate its authority; article I
bankruptcy judges can enforce compliance with their orders by resorting to article
III courts." Id. at 1284. Likewise, "no express statutory authority" for granting the
civil contempt power to bankruptcy judges was found. Id. While certainly not
before the Supreme Court in this matter, none could reasonably argue that the
Court's decision as to the ability of a bankruptcy judge to conduct a jury trial shall
be without significant impact on the no less important matter of the same article I
judge's authority to punish for contempt.
379 130 CONG. REC. H7490-91 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Rep. Fish).
See also Trugman, The Bankruptcy Act of 1984: Marathon Revisited, 3 YALE L. & PoL'Y

REV. 231, 237-38 (1984) (discussing similar concerns voiced by several Congressmen at the time of BAFJA's passage).
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trial question, and, furthermore, the "insoluble jurisdictional
mess" of bankruptcy court jurisdiction,38 ° is rooted in the essential doubts over the scope of powers available to the article I
bankruptcy judges. What is the solution then? As for a legislative response, the learned commentary has stated that "[almong
Congress's [sic] options is the obvious; make bankruptcy courts
[a]rticle III courts." ' 8 ' Indeed, writing in the context of the underlying fraudulent conveyance claims in Granfinancierawith respect to the burgeoning litigation of such claims in leveraged
buy-out bankruptcies, Professor Russo suggested the "ultimate
solution ... may well be for Congress to reconstitute bankruptcy

courts as [a]rticle III courts with full authority to adjudicate
fraudulent conveyance actions as well as other types of
proceedings."382

Yet "having declined in 1978 and 1984 to elevate the bankruptcy courts to such stature, Congress seems unlikely to choose
this route.

' 38 3

There is little reason to think that the virulent

opposition to bestowing article III status upon bankruptcy judges
has changed significantly since the passage of BAFJA in 1984.384
Indeed, the recent Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee (Report) 38 5 indicates that opposition to such a step is as
strong as ever. In particular, the Report firmly espouses the position that the unique status of the article III judiciary is preserved
"only if federal judges are carefully selected from a pool of competent and eager applicants and only if they are sufficiently few in
number to feel a personal stake in the consequences of their actions. Neither condition can be satisfied if there are thousands of
federal judges. 3 86 Significantly, the Report continues to note
that there are now approximately 750 such judgeships. Suggesting that 1,000 is the practical ceiling limit if the article III
380 Hayden v. Edwards (In re Edwards) 104 Bankr. 890, 898 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1989) (citation omitted).
381 Pappone & Welch, High Court Opens Door to Bankruptcy Trials by Jury, BANKR. L.
REV. 5, 11 (Fall 1989) (footnote omitted).
382 Russo, Fraudulent Conveyance Claims in Leveraged Buyout Bankruptcies, 204
N.Y.L.J. 5,(Aug. 6, 1990)(footnote omitted). See also "ABI Committee Reports Judicial Improvement", American Bankruptcy Institute Newsletter, Vol. IX, No. 3 at 1819 (May, June 1990) (statement of chairman Richard Lieb regarding the consideration of an article III "Commercial Court" to handle bankruptcy and similar cases).
383 Pappone & Welch, supra note 373, at 11.
384 See Countryman, supra note 34.
385 Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee (April 2, 1990).
386 Id. at 7. See also Marathon, 458 U.S. at 118 (White, J. dissenting) ("The addition of several hundred [bankruptcy] specialists may substantially change, whether
for good or bad, the character of the federal bench").
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bench is to continue to perform its required functions without a
significant decline in quality, the committee posited that "we may
be approaching the limits of the natural growth" of the federal
judiciary.387
In this instance, the outcome is glaringly obvious. The elevation to article III status of the existing bankruptcy bench would
create in excess of two hundred and eighty additional judgeships.
Based upon the figures and beliefs espoused in the Report, this
would be highly detrimental to the quality of the judicial branch.
While the Report does not necessarily reflect the majority view of
either the Congress or the courts, it certainly is strong evidence
that any move to advance the bankruptcy judges beyond their
present article I authorization shall meet the same fierce challenge that proved insurmountable both when the Code was first
enacted and with the 1984 Amendments.
The concerns raised by the Report are not to be taken
lightly. A significant dilution of the power and prestige of the
article III bench, whether by the creation of an excessive number
of judgeships or by any other means, is to be scrupulously
avoided. More is not better in this realm. Nevertheless, the fears
of a diminution of the federal bench by overexpansion are exacerbated by the tired old cliches that traditionally relegated courts
of bankruptcy to some deep substrata in the federal court system,
and fostered a view of those courts as inhabiting a netherworld:
presiding over an arcane system of law and litigants. As we near
the dawn of the twenty-first century, however, must these oldfashioned notions continue to shackle the entire system of bankruptcy court jurisdiction? This author thinks not.
Most assuredly, the very nature of modern bankruptcy proceedings is ample justification for according article III status to
those jurists primarily responsible for hearing such cases. Once
again, the nation finds itself upon hard times. Given the present
gyrations of today's economy, more and more entities shall be
seeking protection under the bankruptcy laws, compelling their
creditors and other parties in interest to venture into that specialized forum. As more and more persons and businesses are subjected to the sometimes rough justice of the bankruptcy court,
can it be denied that they are entitled to an adjudication by a
judge enjoying the stature of article III? To do otherwise would
likely undermine the faith of the citizenry in the judicial branch,
387

Id. at 8.
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as well as perpetuate outmoded ideas about the supposed inferiority of the courts of bankruptcy and their judges.
Moreover, putting aside the foregoing concerns arising primarily from difficult economic times, today's bankruptcy court
would be no less active in an expanding economy. Bankruptcy
proceedings, as specifically in the Chapter 11 reorganization, no
longer signify the end of the road for a dying business. Bankruptcy is now a management tool, an option as viable as any
other proposed course of corporate action. Who can doubt that
the reorganization scenario is now imbedded in our corporate
culture, following the filings of Texaco, Eastern, LTV, and so
many others? As each day the bankruptcy courts become more
and more the commercial equity courts of this nation, who could
argue against investing the judges assigned that awesome responsibility with article III status. 88
In sum, the best course is clearly marked. "[T]hose who exercise the judicial power of the United States under [a]rticle III
must be [a]rticle III judges." ' 89 The power to preside over bankruptcy proceedings is, especially today, a crucial segment of the
judicial power. The power to preside over jury trials is an "essential attribute" of that power. If our bankruptcy judges are to
be the full-bodied, vigorous adjudicators of that vital body of law,
they must have that essential attribute, and, therefore, should be
made article III judges.
V.

CONCLUSION

The controversy over the power of bankruptcy judges to
conduct jury trials has plagued the bankruptcy system since the
United States Supreme Court decreed in Marathon that such a
prerogative was an "essential attribute" of the article III power.
Subsequent to that landmark decision, Congress attempted to
chart a course between Scylla and Charybdis by addressing this
issue and other constitutional infirmities in the 1984 AmendImportantly, "an [a]rticle 3 bankruptcy court would not elevate bankruptcy
judges to the level of district court judges .... [B]ankruptcy judges would not be
paid the same as district court judges, would not have the same jurisdiction, could
not be assigned to other federal district courts as district court judges may be, and
would not have the same personnel and facilities as district court judges." 130
CONG. REC. H1847 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1984) (statement of Rep. Edwards). While
not diminishing the importance of the bankruptcy court, this statement goes far to
debunk the myth that article III bankruptcy judges would be equal in all respects to
other article III federal jurists.
389 Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537,
550 (9th Cir. 1984 (en banc) (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
388

332

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 21:258

ments to the Bankruptcy Code, while continuing the bankruptcy
courts as article I tribunals. The abrogation of Bankruptcy Rule
9015, the jury trial rule, was thought by some to be the last step
in clarifying the issue, by withdrawing a procedural device often
used erroneously as a substantive basis for the conduct of jury
trials in bankruptcy courts.
All the foregoing, however, did not yield a final, dispositive
solution. The Court's decision in Granfinanciera,by explicitly refusing to decide that day if bankruptcy judges are empowered to
conduct jury trials, merely serves as a point of demarcation between the historical basis of the controversy and the appellate
decisions that may bring the issue squarely before the Court.
In contrasting the opposing poles of Ben Cooper and United
Missouri Bank, and all the cases which precede them, it becomes
clear that the forces opposed to bankruptcy judges conducting
jury trials have the superior argument. A well reasoned analysis
of the relevant statutes makes it self-evident that there is surely
lacking a legislative authorization for article I bankruptcy judges
to preside over jury trials. Put in the proper light, any contrary
reading of the statutory provisions does violence to their plain
meaning and any acceptable construction thereof. Much the
same can be said for the withdrawal of the jury trial rule; that step
representing the abrogation of a procedural appendage, now
rendered a nullity with no statutory basis from which to draw
validity.
The constitutional barrier of article III is likewise impregnable. By condemning bankruptcy judges to article I status, the
legislature has foreclosed that tribunal's exercise of an "essential
attribute" of article III: the ability to preside over jury trials.
From Marathon to Granfinanciera, the Court has time and again
staked out the boundaries of the article III power, while concomitantly circumscribing the limitations of article I bankruptcy
judges. Unless and until Congress changes their status, the
bankruptcy courts are restricted to playing a subservient role to
the article III bench; a function that does not include the power
to conduct jury trials.
A fair reading of United Missouri Bank and similar holdings
reflects the correctness of all of the foregoing. The Ben Cooper
decision, on the other hand, finds itself attempting to climb a
very slippery slope indeed. Moreover, the Second Circuit's holding tempts fate itself, by stretching the constitutionality of its
core/non-core jurisdictional underpinnings. Given this state of
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affairs, what does the future hold for bankruptcy judges and jury
trials?
Paramount to all other things in the greater scheme of the
bankruptcy court system is the inescapable fact that a bankruptcy
court is essentially a court of equity.39° Second only to that penultimate fact "is that whatever equitable powers remain in the
bankruptcy courts must and can3 only
be exercised within the conl
fines of the Bankruptcy Code." '

It may now be necessary to return to the pre-Code days
when it was assumed, "because bankruptcy courts were courts of
equity with limited jurisdiction,1 39 2 that bankruptcy courts are

not the appropriate forum for jury trials. It can only be hoped
that the Supreme Court shall do so, and permit the still developing bankruptcy court system to forge ahead unburdened by this
troublesome controversy.
In conclusion, we are reminded that 1992 marks the tenth
anniversary of Marathon, the judicial beginning of the instant controversy. Yet it also makes the quincentennial of the voyage of
Columbus to the New World. No small irony here, as the term
"bankruptcy" itself is derived from "banca rotta," Italian for
"broken bench": the draconian fate of medieval guildsmen
fallen into insolvency. When the Supreme Court navigates these
treacherous waters, let us hope this new voyage finally resolves
the controversy over the power of bankruptcy judges to conduct
jury trials.
AuTHOR's NOTE

At the time this article went to press, preparationswere underwayfor a
second appeal of Ben Cooper to the High Court. Mere weeks ago, the
Second Circuit resolved a jurisdictionalquestion and reinstated its original
opinion. Ben Cooper, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1991). Indeed, when the
Justices survey the landscape upon the return of Ben Cooper they shall
390 Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 327 (1966). See also Atlas Roofing Co. v.
Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 454 n. 11 (1977)
(bankruptcy court is "a specialized court of equity"); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292
U.S. 234, 240 (1934) (bankruptcy court proceedings "inherently proceeding in equity"); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 304 (1939); Bank of Manin v. England, 385 U.S.
99, 103 (1966) ("There is an overriding consideration that equitable principles
govern the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction"); NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465
U.S. 513, 527 (1984); United States v. Energy Resources Co., 110 S. Ct. 2139, 2142
(1990).
391 Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988) (White, J.,
writing for a unanimous Court).
392 Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frates (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 109 Bankr. 968, 971 (D.
Colo. 1989), remanded, 911 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1990).
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find that the intercircuitconflict is now exacerbated, given the lack of any
pending appealfrom the circuit decisions in either United Missouri Bank
or Kaiser Steel. Interestingly, the author learnedfrom an informed source
that no appeal was taken in Kaiser Steel, partly in reliance upon the
pendency of Ben Cooper.
For now, other battlefronts have opened in both the east and the west.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has decided that, inter alia, "bankruptcy courts have no authorization to conductjury trials" in noncore proceedings. Taxel v. Electronic Sports Research (In re
Cinematronics, Inc.), 916 F.2d 1444, 1451 (9th Cir. 1990) (reversing district court's refusal to withdraw reference of matter to bankruptcy
court, holding that bankruptcyjudges may hold jury trials in core proceedings). While the opinionfocused on the propriety of the district court's denial of a motion to withdraw the reference, CircuitJudge Hugfound that
"grave[s]eventh [a]mendment problems would arise" if ajury trial were to
be conducted by a bankruptcy judge whose decisions were subject to de
novo review. Id. at 1451. Recently, the same conclusion was reached by
the Third Circuit in Beard v. Braunstein, 914 F.2d 434 (3d Cir.
1990). Diverging from its neighboring court of appeals, the court explainedthat the limitations of the seventh amendment "are not compatible"
with the present statutory requirement of review de novo in noncore proceedings, thus foreclosingjury trials in the bankruptcyforum. Id. at 443.
The findings of these circuit tribunals, that bankruptcy courts cannot
conduct jury trials in noncore matters, now aligns, in numerical order, the
Third, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits against a single decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. This truly presents a strategic
challengefor any litigation general.
Finally, the same day that the Court vacated Ben Cooper, it issued a
per curiam opinion on a petitionfor certiorari in Lagenkamp v. Culp,
111 S. Ct. 330, 331 (1990), reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 721 (1991),
holding that there is no jury trial entitlementfor a defendant/creditorin a
preference action, where that creditorpreviously filed a claim in the bankruptcy proceeding. Relying on Granfinanciera, the Court reaffirmed the
importance of the equity jurisdictionof the bankruptcy court. Id. (emphasis
in the original). While this might be a mere coincidence, it may also be
interpreted as a subtle message from the Justices that the equitablejurisdiction of the bankruptcy court negates jury trials in that article I forum.
What does this portendfor the bankruptcy court system? The obvious
upshot is anotherinterval during which the fractious dispute shall continue
unabated, engendering even more disruptive, wasteful litigation, that shall
no doubt result in additionalcontradictory opinions by the various circuits.
With the reinstatement and upcoming appeal of the formerly vacated Ben
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Cooper, the once crestfallen hopes for a final resolution of the matter have
been resurrected. One can only trust in the Court's willingness to settle
swiftly the controversy, on statutory and/orconstitutionalgrounds, when it
revisits Ben Cooper or, quite possibly, reviews Cinenatronics, Perkinson, or some other yet to be issued appellate ruling. In sum, it is the author'sfervent hope that theJustices of the United States Supreme Court take
into account all of the complex, diverse issues, policies, and interests at work
here, such as those mentioned in this article.

